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STRIP-OFF: WHAT IS THE CORRECT PROCEDURE TO 
AVOID A WHOLLY UNSECURED JUNIOR MORTGAGE? 
INTRODUCTION 
When the housing market began to collapse in 2007,1 the application of the 
rarely used rule for stripping2 junior mortgages3 in chapter 13 cases became an 
important issue in bankruptcy.4 “Strip-off”5 entitles the bankruptcy estate to 
avoid a wholly unsecured6 junior mortgage on a debtor’s principal residence.7 
For twenty years prior to the housing crisis, home values consistently and 
predictably increased over time,8 and banks considered mortgage-backed 
securities a very safe investment.9 During this time the value of a debtor’s 
home usually exceeded the value of the holder’s claim on both the debtor’s 
first and junior mortgage.10 However, the recent economic situation produced a 
rapid decline in housing prices that could continue into the foreseeable 
 
 1 Richard D. Thomas, Comment, Tipping the Scales in Chapter 11: How Distressed Debt Investors 
Decrease Debtor Leverage and the Efficacy of Business Reorganization, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 213, 216 
(2010).  
 2 See, e.g., W. HOMER DRAKE, JR. ET AL., CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 9C:5 (2010) 
(“Because a plan may impose such modification of a secured claim over the creditor’s objection, this treatment 
is commonly referred to as ‘cramdown’; the consequent effect on the lien is referred to as ‘lien stripping.’”). 
 3 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1103 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “junior mortgage” as “[a] mortgage that is 
subordinate to another mortgage on the same property”). 
 4 Elizabeth M. Abood-Carroll, Are Adversary Proceedings Necessary to Strip Mortgagees’ Liens in 
Chapter 13?: Analyzing Supreme Court’s Answer in Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, AM. BANKR. INST. 
J., July–Aug. 2009, at 14, 14.  
 5 DRAKE ET AL., supra note 2, § 9C:5 (“[E]limination of a lien due to the lack of any value in the 
encumbered property to support a secured claim is referred to as a ‘strip off.’”). 
 6 “Wholly unsecured” means the value of the encumbered property is less than the entire amount of the 
junior claim after value is accessed to the senior claim. See, e.g., Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty (In re Pond), 
252 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000)). 
 7 Tanner v. FirstPlus Fin., Inc. (In re Tanner), 217 F.3d 1357, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 8 Two graphs using the Composite 10 and Composite 20 indices show housing prices generally trending 
upwards from 1987 to January 2007. Press Release, Standard & Poors, Home Prices Continued to Decline in 
November 2011 According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices (Jan. 31, 2012), 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/articles/en/us/?articleType=PDF&assetID=1245328085691.  
 9 See Jason Cox et al., Why Did the Credit Crisis Spread to Global Markets?, U. IOWA CENTER FOR 
INT’L FIN. & DEV., 1–3 (Mar. 2010), http://blogs.law.uiowa.edu/ebook/sites/default/files/Part_5_2.pdf. 
 10 See Alex Ulam, Why Second-Lien Loans Remain a Worry, AMERICAN BANKER (May 2, 2011, 3:16 
PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/specialreports/176_5/second-lien-loans-remain-worry-1036731-1.html.  
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future.11 Subsequently, as the country entered into the economic tailspin now 
known as the Great Recession,12 foreclosure rates skyrocketed.13 
Before the mortgage crisis, homeowners commonly mortgaged their homes 
multiple times to extract most of the equity in their properties,14 causing 
mortgage payments to become a higher percentage of their income.15 Many 
homeowners’ incomes have fallen during the recession;16 not being able to 
keep up with their loan payments, many have ended up defaulting on their 
mortgages.17 Homeowners who are unable to pay their debts may file chapter 
13 bankruptcies in an attempt to retain their homes.18 Chapter 13 allows 
debtors to keep their primary residences and strip off junior mortgages 
exceeding the current value of the debtors’ homes.19 The debtor is obligated to 
repay the first mortgage and any junior mortgages, on a priority basis, up to the 
fair market value of the home.20 Any wholly unsecured junior mortgage can be 
thus stripped off. Given the current economic situation, strip-off is an 
extremely powerful tool for debtors.21 
 
 11 Robert J. Shiller, Why Home Prices May Keep Falling, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2009, at BU4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/07/business/economy/07view.html (“Home prices in the United States have 
been falling for nearly three years, and the decline may well continue for some time.”). 
 12 David Line Batty, Dodd-Frank’s Requirement of “Skin in the Game” for Asset-Backed Securities May 
Scalp Corporate Loan Liquidity, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 13, 13 (2011) (“The economic devastation [that 
began in 2007] has come to be known as the Great Recession because it has had far-reaching economic and 
societal effects not felt since the Great Depression which inspired its name.”).  
 13 See Ronald Mann, Op-Ed, A New Chapter for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at A27, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/opinion/12mann.html (“Almost 5 percent of mortgage loans 
are now in foreclosure, an increase of more than 85 percent since the beginning of 2008, and more than 10 
percent of credit card accounts are delinquent.”). 
 14 Richard L. Ngo, The Proper Valuation Date of Residential Property for a § 506(a) Lien Strip, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2010, at 14, 14 (“Prior to the foreclosure crisis, financing was, to put it lightly, 
easy to obtain. It was not uncommon for homeowners to mortgage their homes two, three, even four times in 
order to pull out all of their equity in the property.”). 
 15 See Nick Timiraos, Linkage in Income, Home Prices Shifts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2011, at A2, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904253204576512532609819142.html (“For the 
U.S. as a whole, home prices were around 2.9 times incomes from 1985 to 2000. But during the housing boom, 
values increased at a much faster rate than incomes. The price-to-income ratio peaked at around 5.1 in 2005.”). 
 16 Memorandum from Heather Boushey et al., Center for American Progress, New Census Data Reveals 
Decreased Income and Health Coverage 5 (Sept. 17, 2010), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/2010/09/pdf/census_poverty_memo.pdf (“Family income has fallen by 5.3 percent since the [Great] 
[R]ecession began, compared to a 2 percent decline over the early 2000s recession and a 3.4 percent decline 
over the early 1990s recession.”). 
 17 See Mann, supra note 13, at A27. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See infra Part I. 
 20 See Ngo, supra note 14, at 14. 
 21 Id. 
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However, bankruptcy courts disagree on whether an adversary proceeding22 
is required to strip off a junior mortgage secured by a debtor’s principal 
residence.23 The majority of bankruptcy courts holds that a strip-off does not 
require an adversary proceeding.24 These courts allow strip-off by a contested 
matter such as a Bankruptcy Rule25 3012 motion or the chapter 13 plan 
confirmation process.26 Alternatively, the minority of bankruptcy courts holds 
the opposite view and requires an adversary proceeding pursuant to Rule 
7001(2).27 Some jurisdictions have even taken steps to avoid the issue 
altogether. The Eastern District of Michigan, for instance, enacted Guideline 
12, which requires a debtor to initiate an adversary proceeding in some 
situations to strip off a junior mortgage.28 
This Comment argues in favor of the position taken by a majority of 
bankruptcy courts that strip-off does not require an adversary proceeding. To 
strip off, a debtor must file a motion separate from the plan confirmation 
pursuant to Rule 3012.29 The United States Supreme Court recently ruled on 
the issue of adversary proceeding requirements in bankruptcy.30 In United 
Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, the Court decided two important issues 
applicable to whether strip-off requires an adversary proceeding: (1) the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 
 
 22 Collier on Bankruptcy addresses adversary proceedings, explaining that: 
Adversary proceedings are separate lawsuits within the context of a particular bankruptcy case 
and have all of the attributes of a lawsuit, including the filing and service of a formal complaint 
and application, with certain modifications, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as provided 
in Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules. 
10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 7001.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011). 
 23 David Lloyd & Ariane Holtschlag, Chapter 13 Strip-Off of Junior Mortgages: Not Whether, but How 
Under Current Law, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2009, at 12, 68. 
 24 See, e.g., In re Robert, 313 B.R. 545, 549 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Millspaugh, 302 B.R. 90, 103 
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2003). 
 25 “Bankruptcy Rule” or “Rule” refers to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure whereas “FRCP” 
refers to specific provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 26 In re Millspaugh, 302 B.R. at 103 (“[A] chapter 13 debtor may, in his plan or in a separate (and usually 
preconfirmation) motion, seek to strip off a creditor’s wholly unsecured lien through a valuation process under 
§ 506(a) and Rules 3012 and 9014.”); see also In re Sadala, 294 B.R. 180, 185 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003). 
 27 See, e.g., Pierce v. Beneficial Mortg. Co. of Utah (In re Pierce), 282 B.R. 26, 28 (Bankr. D. Utah 2002) 
(stating that the plain language of Rule 7001(2) requires an adversary proceeding to achieve strip-off); see also 
In re Chukes, 305 B.R. 744, 744–45 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2004). 
 28 E.D. MICH. LBR Guideline 12. 
 29 See In re Bennett, 312 B.R. 843, 847–48 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2004) (holding that strip-off can be 
achieved through motion). 
 30 United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010). 
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sets the constitutional requirement for due process in bankruptcy;31 and (2) res 
judicata32 can bar the appeal of a confirmed plan even though an adversary 
proceeding was not initiated as required by the Bankruptcy Rules.33 The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Espinosa reinforces this Comment’s 
interpretation that a motion is required for a strip-off.34 
The significance of this procedural issue in a strip-off cannot be 
overemphasized given the current economic climate.35 The inefficiency of the 
bankruptcy process has made it difficult for debtors to utilize bankruptcy to 
protect their homes from foreclosure.36 It is imperative that the bankruptcy 
procedure is streamlined and that debtors understand the correct procedure to 
strip off a junior mortgage. If the incorrect procedure is used, the creditor 
whose lien was stripped off could contest the strip-off after the court has 
confirmed the plan.37 An erroneous strip-off thus puts the debtor’s chapter 13 
payment plan in jeopardy. If the court finds that improper notice was given to 
the creditor because an adversary procedure is required, a court could then find 
that the lien was never actually stripped off.38 Instead of the debtor’s lien being 
discharged, the debtor’s obligation would have increased.39 Debtors who do 
not follow the correct procedure for a strip-off could lose their homes despite 
making all the plan payments and receiving discharge. 
There are several reasons not to require an adversary proceeding to strip off 
a junior mortgage. Adversary proceedings require additional attorney and 
 
 31 The Supreme Court prior to Espinosa had not addressed the constitutional standard for due process in 
bankruptcy, causing confusion among the lower courts. See In re Forrest, 424 B.R. 831, 834–35 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2009) (requiring a higher burden to meet constitutional due process when the Bankruptcy Code and Rules 
mandate more formal procedures), overruled by Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367; see also David Gray Carlson, The 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in Reorganization Cases: Do They Have a Constitutional Dimension?, 
84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 251, 294 (2010) (“[Espinosa] clearly overrules City of New York v. New York, New Haven 
& Hartford R.R[.], which may have held that the procedural rules of bankruptcy set the constitutional 
minimum for due process . . . [and] indicates that Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. sets the 
minimum.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 32 Res judicata means the matter cannot be raised again, either in the same court or in a different court. A 
court will use res judicata to deny reconsideration of a matter. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 
1425. 
 33 Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1378, 1380; Carlson, supra note 31, at 266.  
 34 See infra Part III.A. 
 35 See Mann, supra note 13, at A27 (“Almost 5 percent of mortgage loans [were] in foreclosure [in early 
2010], an increase of more than 85 percent since the beginning of 2008, and more than 10 percent of credit 
card accounts [were] delinquent.”). 
 36 Id. (“[O]ur bankruptcy system is too difficult and expensive for the people who use it.”).  
 37 See Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 14. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
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filing fees.40 Furthermore, adversary proceedings delay the confirmation 
process because the court cannot confirm a plan before it decides whether to 
strip off the lien.41 The plan repayment period does not begin until 
confirmation; however, the Bankruptcy Code requires debtors to begin making 
plan payments thirty days after the plan is filed.42 Delays therefore can be 
harmful to debtors.43 
This Comment is organized into five parts. Part I provides the relevant 
background to the strip-off process and its related statutory provisions. It 
explains how, through the use of a hypothetical situation, a debtor can strip off 
a lien using §§ 506(a), 506(d), and 1322(b)(2).44 Part I also includes an 
analysis of two Supreme Court opinions discussing lien stripping: Dewsnup v. 
Timm45 and Nobelman v. American Savings Bank.46 Finally, Part I outlines 
Rules 3012 and 7001, which are at the heart of the disagreement over the 
correct procedure to strip off. 
Part II explains the opposing views of the majority and minority of 
bankruptcy courts. It lays out the minority approach requiring an adversary 
proceeding pursuant to Rule 7001 and includes an analysis of the majority’s 
reasoning in the bankruptcy court opinion in In re King.47 It also argues that 
notice through a motion pursuant to Rule 3012 is a necessary procedure to strip 
off.48 
Part III argues in favor of the majority approach, analyzing United Student 
Aid Funds v. Espinosa49 and focusing on the case’s precedential impact on the 
procedure for strip-off. 
 
 40 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (2006) (amended 2011) (“The clerk of each district court shall require the parties 
instituting any civil action, suit[,] or proceeding . . . to pay a filing fee of $350 . . . .”); id. § 1930(a) (amended 
2011) (“The Judicial Conference of the United States may prescribe additional fees in cases under title 11 of 
the same kind as the Judicial Conference prescribes under section 1914(b) of this title.”); accord Abood-
Carroll, supra note 4, at 14 (“Some attorneys would say that adversaries require additional expenses such as 
filing fees and attorney fees.”). 
 41 See infra Part V.A; see also Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 14. 
 42 Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 14. 
 43 Id. 
 44 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), (d), 1322(b)(2). Each “§” designation refers to a provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code unless otherwise provided.  
 45 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992). 
 46 Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993). 
 47 In re King, 290 B.R. 641 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003). 
 48 Infra Part II.C.2. 
 49 United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010). 
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Part IV presents the variety of canons of statutory construction used by 
courts.50 It argues that applying these principles demonstrates that Rule 3012 
applies to strip-off. Additionally, it explains that the advisory committee’s 
intent indicates that Congress intended to apply Rule 3012 to strip-off. 
Finally, Part V provides policy considerations suggesting that strip-off 
should not require an adversary proceeding. It highlights the additional cost 
and time associated with adversary proceedings. Part V also proposes that an 
adversary proceeding requirement would give too much leverage to creditors. 
Another argument expounded in Part V is that the additional notice afforded by 
an adversary proceeding may be unnecessary. Part V contends that a Rule 3012 
motion is sufficient to give the creditor actual notice of strip-off. Finally, Part 
V asserts that an adversary proceeding does not furnish any necessary 
procedural protections not granted by a motion.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Henry Homeowner Hypothetical 
Consider the following hypothetical: Henry Homeowner wanted to buy a 
home in Tucson, Arizona, to use as his principal residence. He procured a 
mortgage with State Secured Bank for $450,000, which was the market value 
of the home at that time. After several years had passed, Henry began looking 
for money to invest in the stock market. His home had increased in value 
substantially so that the market value of the home reached $750,000. To 
extract the equity from his home, he took out a second mortgage from Joey’s 
Junior Bank for $300,000. Several years later, the housing market crashed, and 
Henry was in serious financial trouble. He lost all the money he had invested in 
the stock market, and to make matters worse, he lost his job. Henry found a 
new job, but the pay was significantly less. He could no longer afford to pay 
his debts. He subsequently filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy protection. 
During bankruptcy proceedings, Henry petitions the court to value his 
home at the current fair market value of $300,000. Pursuant to § 506(a), Henry 
still owes Secured Bank $350,000, and he also owes Junior Bank $250,000.51 
Henry’s attorney tells him that, because of the interplay between §§ 506(a), 
 
 50 For an example of how courts apply these canons of statutory construction, see Robinson v. Shell Oil 
Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 346 (1997) (construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 51 Henry paid $100,000 of the principal on the Secured Bank mortgage, and he paid $50,000 of the 
principal on the Junior Bank mortgage.  
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506(d), and 1322(b)(2), he can strip off the wholly unsecured second mortgage 
from Junior Bank.52 A strip-off would completely eliminate Junior Bank’s 
lien.53 Henry’s attorney is pleased that he can help his client remove the Junior 
Bank lien; however, he is unsure of the correct procedure to achieve this result. 
B. Relevant Bankruptcy Statutes 
To understand the proper procedure for the strip-off of a wholly unsecured 
junior mortgage, it is important to understand how the relationship among 
§§ 506(a), 506(d), and 1322(b)(2) create the opportunity for strip-off. Section 
506(a) describes the “valuation requirement” for secured claims and the extent 
to which a claim is deemed secured.54 Section 506(a) requires: (1) a lien or 
right to setoff;55 (2) an allowed claim;56 and (3) a creditor.57 If these three 
requirements are met, § 506(a) requires a determination of the collateral’s 
value.58 Section 506(a) valuation is important because it requires the 
bifurcation of a creditor’s secured claim into secured and unsecured portions if 
the collateral is worth less than the creditor’s claim.59 An allowed secured 
claim is limited to the collateral’s value.60 Any portion of the claim that 
exceeds the collateral’s value is deemed unsecured.61 In the Henry Homeowner 
hypothetical, the creditor, Junior Bank, has an allowed junior claim of 
$300,000. The collateral has no value to secure this claim; therefore, it 
becomes an unsecured claim under § 506(a).62 
 
 52 See Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 836 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000) (“[I]f the property 
is valued at one penny greater than the claim of the senior mortgagee, the junior mortgagee’s claim would 
receive full protection. However, if the property is valued at one penny less than the claim of the senior 
mortgagee, the junior mortgagee would be left completely unprotected.” (quoting In re Perry, 235 B.R. 603, 
607 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1999), overruled by Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass’n (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 
277 (5th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 53 DRAKE ET AL., supra note 2, § 9C:40. 
 54 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 506.03; accord Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 961 
(1997). 
 55 The central premise of setoff is that “[i]f A is indebted to B, and B is likewise indebted to A, it makes 
sense simply to apply one debt in satisfaction of the other rather than require A and B to satisfy their mutual 
liabilities separately.” 5 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 553.01. 
 56 An allowed claim is a claim that is deemed “valid under applicable nonbankruptcy law and not invalid 
under some provision of the Code.” Id. ¶ 506.03. 
 57 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006). 
 58 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 506.03[6]. 
 59 Id. ¶ 506.03[4]. 
 60 McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 61 Id. 
 62 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). 
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Section 506(a) deems Junior Bank’s claim wholly unsecured; however, 
courts disagree about whether a debtor can avoid the claim using § 506(d).63 
Section 506(d) dictates the avoidance of liens secured by claims disallowed by 
the Code.64 Section 506(d) provides that if a secured claim against a debtor is 
not an allowed secured claim, then that claim is avoided.65 The debtor’s ability 
to use § 506(d) to avoid a wholly unsecured junior mortgage has caused much 
dispute amongst the courts.66 Several courts have held that strip-off requires 
the use of § 506(d) to avoid a wholly unsecured mortgage.67 Other courts have 
held that various Code provisions, other than § 506(d), could be used to avoid 
a junior mortgage.68 Regardless of the Code provisions used, every circuit 
court that has considered the issue has held that a debtor can avoid a wholly 
unsecured junior mortgage.69 
Section 1322(b)(2) does not prohibit the modification of Junior Bank’s lien 
because it is secured by Henry’s principal residence.70 Section 1322(b)(2) 
addresses the extent to which a plan may modify the rights of secured claim 
holders.71 Section 1332(b)(2) is the “anti-modification provision”72 and permits 
a chapter 13 debtor’s plan to “modify the rights of holders of secured claims, 
 
 63 Compare In re Robert, 313 B.R. 545, 549–50 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2004) (“If the court values the 
security interest at zero [under § 506(a)], the lien shall be stripped off upon completion of the Chapter 13 plan 
and issuance of discharge pursuant to Code § 506(d) without further litigation.”), with In re Hill, 440 B.R. 176, 
181 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2010) (“Since § 506(d) does not permit lien strips in Chapter 7 cases, the Bankruptcy 
Code operates to prevent it from being the statutory basis for lien strips in [Chapter 13] cases as well.”). 
 64 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 506.01; see also 11 U.S.C. § 506(d); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 
415–16 (1992) (discussing the application of § 506(d)). 
 65 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (authorizing the avoidance of a lien by a debtor if that lien is not an allowed 
secured claim and does not fall into one of two exceptions). 
 66 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 506.06[1]. 
 67 See, e.g., In re Robert, 313 B.R. at 549–50; In re Sadala, 294 B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003); 
In re King, 290 B.R. 641, 648 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003) (“Where the result of that claim determination process is 
that the creditor’s claim is determined to be wholly unsecured, the creditor’s lien is ‘void’ [pursuant to 
§ 506(d)].”). 
 68 See, e.g., Pees v. DAN Joint Venture II (In re Claar), 368 B.R. 670, 677–78 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007) 
(reasoning that the discharge of the wholly unsecured lien could be achieved through the “combined operative 
effect of §§ 506(a) . . . , 1322(b)(2) . . . , 1325(a)(5) . . . , and 1327(b) and (c)”); In re Hill, 304 B.R. 800, 803–
04 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003). 
 69 Lloyd & Holtschlag, supra note 23, at 12; see also Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 
F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 2002); Lane v. W. Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663, 668–69 (6th Cir. 
2002); Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty (In re Pond), 252 F.3d 122, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2001); McDonald v. Master 
Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 615 (3d Cir. 2000); Tanner v. FirstPlus Fin., Inc. (In re Tanner), 
217 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2000); Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass’n (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 
288 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 70 See, e.g., In re Lane, 280 F.3d at 669. 
 71 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 72 Padilla v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. (In re Padilla), 379 B.R. 643, 661 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007). 
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other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the 
debtor’s principal residence.”73 Thus, if a court determines that a creditor holds 
a secured claim under § 506(a), the debtor “may modify terms such as the 
amount of the payments on the claim, the timing of payments[,] and the 
finance charges, unless that creditor holds a mortgage protected from 
modification.”74 Courts have wrestled with the nuances of when to apply the 
anti-modification provision, which disallows bifurcation under § 506(a). 
C. Supreme Court Precedent 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank75 
answered the question of whether splitting an undersecured76 home mortgage 
claim into secured and unsecured portions under § 506(a) constitutes an 
impermissible § 1322(b)(2) modification.77 One year before its decision in 
Nobelman, the Supreme Court decided Dewsnup v. Timm.78 The Court in 
Dewsnup held that a chapter 7 debtor could not strip down79 the unsecured 
portion of an undersecured mortgage.80 The interpretation of this decision 
created a split among the circuit courts. One side held that § 1322(b)(2) 
prohibits bifurcation of home mortgages in chapter 13 cases, and the other side 
found such bifurcations permissible.81 
The Supreme Court resolved the circuit split in Nobelman.82 The Court 
unanimously held that § 1322(b)(2) prohibited the plan from modifying the 
state law rights of a lienholder whose lien is secured by the debtor’s principal 
residence.83 The decision did not rely heavily on Dewsnup but instead focused 
 
 73 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 74 8 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 1322.06[1]. 
 75 Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993). 
 76 An undersecured mortgage is a claim that is “greater than the value of the encumbered property.” 
DRAKE ET AL., supra note 2, § 9C:5. 
 77 Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass’n (In re Bartee) 212 F.3d 277, 290 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing 
Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 328–29). 
 78 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992). 
 79 Strip-down is the “[r]eduction of the lien to the value of the encumbered property.” DRAKE ET AL., 
supra note 2, § 9C:5. 
 80 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417; see also 7 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON 
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 3D § 149:7, at 149-51 (2008). 
 81 Compare Nobleman v. Am. Sav. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483, 487–89 (5th Cir. 1992), aff’d, 
508 U.S. 324 (1993) (prohibiting strip-down), with Bellamy v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. (In re Bellamy), 
962 F.2d 176, 182–83 (2d Cir. 1992) (allowing strip-down), overruled by Nobelman, 508 U.S. 324. 
 82 Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 325–26. 
 83 See id. at 325, 332; 8 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 1322.06[1][a][i]. 
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on the phrase “rights of holders” in § 1322(b)(2).84 The rights protected from 
modification are defined as property rights and contract rights “created and 
defined by state law.”85 Because the creditors’ contractual rights to full 
payment would be modified, the Court concluded that it was “more 
reasonable” to bar the modification of an undersecured claim.86 The Court held 
that a plan providing for no payments on the unsecured portion of the lien 
could not be confirmed.87 Therefore, in the hypothetical described above, it 
would not be permissible for the bankruptcy court to allow Henry to avoid the 
undersecured portion of Secured Bank’s first mortgage by stripping down 
Secured Bank’s lien from $350,000 to $300,000. 
The Nobelman Court did not entirely preclude the use of § 506 bifurcation 
in chapter 13 cases as it did chapter 7 cases after Dewsnup.88 The Nobelman 
opinion strongly implied that a wholly unsecured lien could be stripped off.89 
The Court emphasized the fact that the creditor was “still the ‘holder’ of a 
‘secured claim,’ because petitioner’s home retain[ed] $23,500 of value as 
collateral.”90 If a creditor holds a lien secured by no value, then the creditor 
does not hold a secured claim protected by § 1322(b)(2).91 After the Nobelman 
decision, each circuit court to consider the issue has sustained the strip-off of 
wholly unsecured junior mortgages.92 In the Henry hypothetical, Junior Bank 
is not a “holder of a secured claim” because Junior Bank’s lien has no value.93 
 
 84 Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 329–30. 
 85 Id. at 329 (quoting Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)). The Nobelman Court stated: 
The bank’s “rights,” therefore, are reflected in the relevant mortgage instruments . . . . They 
include the right to repayment of the principal in monthly installments over a fixed term at 
specified adjustable rates of interest, the right to retain the lien until the debt is paid off, the right 
to accelerate the loan upon default and to proceed against petitioners’ residence by foreclosure 
and public sale, and the right to bring an action to recover any deficiency remaining after 
foreclosure. These are the rights that were “bargained for by the mortgagor and the mortgagee,” 
and are rights protected from modification by § 1322(b)(2). 
Id. at 329–30 (citations omitted) (quoting Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417). 
 86 8 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 1322.06[1][a][i]; see also Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 331–32. 
 87 See Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 326–32. 
 88 See 7 NORTON, supra note 80, § 149:7, at 149-53. 
 89 8 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 1322.06[1][a][i] (interpreting Nobelman, 508 U.S. 324). 
 90 See Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 329, quoted in 8 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 1322.06[1][a][i] (alteration in 
original). 
 91 8 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 1322.06[1][a][i]. 
 92 Lloyd & Holtschlag, supra note 23, at 12 & n.10 (listing the circuit court opinions upholding the 
majority view). 
 93 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 1322(b)(2) (2006). 
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Therefore, under the Nobelman framework, Henry would be able to strip off 
the wholly unsecured lien held by Junior Bank. 
D. Relevant Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 
Henry can strip off Junior Bank’s mortgage; however, his attorney still 
does not know the proper procedure to achieve strip-off. The Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure, the bankruptcy counterpart to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, apply to every case under title 11 in both bankruptcy courts 
and federal district courts.94 Whether strip-off requires an adversary 
proceeding rests on whether Bankruptcy Rule 3012 or 7001 applies.95 Parties 
use Rule 3012 in conjunction with § 506 of the Code.96 Under Rule 3012, the 
bankruptcy court may determine the value of the secured claim upon motion of 
any party in interest.97 Rule 3012 also provides that notice must be given “to 
the holder of the secured claim and any other entity as the court may direct.”98 
The majority of courts holds that strip-off is a valuation issue under § 506, and 
therefore Rule 3012 applies.99 
The minority of courts takes the opposing view, holding that Rule 7001 
applies.100 Bankruptcy Rule 7001 classifies adversary proceedings into ten 
categories, and each category of proceeding is addressed in a different 
clause.101 The disagreement among bankruptcy courts over the application of 
Rule 7001 to strip-off has focused on Clause 2 of Rule 7001.102 Clause 2 
requires an adversary proceeding where the court must “determine the validity, 
priority, or extent of a lien or other interest in property.”103 The term “validity” 
is defined as “the existence or legitimacy of the lien itself.”104 “Priority” is “the 
 
 94 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001; Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Rapid Am. Corp. (In re Celotex Corp.), 124 F.3d 619, 
629–30 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 95 Compare In re King, 290 B.R. 641, 646–48 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003) (applying Rule 3012 to strip-off), 
with In re Chukes, 305 B.R. 744, 744–45 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2004) (applying Rule 7001 to strip-off). 
 96 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012 advisory committee’s notes; see also 9 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 3012.01 
(suggesting Bankruptcy Rule 3012 is broader than its antecedents under prior law). 
 97 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See, e.g., In re King, 290 B.R. at 646, 648. 
 100 See, e.g., Pierce v. Beneficial Mortg. Co. of Utah (In re Pierce), 282 B.R. 26, 28 (Bankr. D. Utah 
2002). 
 101 Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Adversary Proceedings in Bankruptcy: A Sideshow, 79 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 951, 954 (2005); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001. 
 102 See In re Millspaugh, 302 B.R. 90, 96–97 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003) (listing cases that have considered 
whether Rule 7001 applies to strip-off). 
 103 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(2). 
 104 In re King, 290 B.R. at 646. 
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rank held by the mortgage in relation to other claims attached to the same 
property.”105 Some courts in the minority view strip-off as changing the 
priority of the lien and therefore falling under Rule 7001(2).106 
The third term, “extent of a lien,” creates another point of disagreement 
regarding whether Bankruptcy Rule 7001 applies to strip-off.107 Courts and 
commentators have inferred at least two meanings from the term “extent of a 
lien” in the context of Rule 7001108: one is the “scope of the property 
encompassed by or subject to the lien”;109 another is the “value of the property 
subject to the lien.”110 The different interpretations of Bankruptcy Rules 7001 
and 3012 have created a split among bankruptcy courts.111 
II. JUDICIAL CONFUSION CONCERNING THE PROCEDURE REQUIRED TO STRIP 
OFF A LIEN 
There is no consensus on whether Rule 3012 or Rule 7001 applies to strip-
off.112 The bankruptcy court split indicates uncertainty surrounding whether 
Congress intended to require an adversary proceeding to strip off a wholly 
unsecured junior mortgage. However, in light of the reasoning of the majority 
of courts and the Supreme Court’s decision in Espinosa,113 Rule 3012 should 
apply to strip-off, and an adversary proceeding under Rule 7001 is 
unnecessary. 
The Bankruptcy Rules provide for the resolution of disputes in two ways: 
contested matters and adversary proceedings.114 The Bankruptcy Rules make 
this distinction because certain matters warrant greater protection, which is 
provided by an adversary proceeding, than would be provided in contested 
matters via a motion or hearing.115 In practice, the differences between 
 
 105 In re Sadala, 294 B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003). 
 106 In re Chukes, 305 B.R. 744, 744–45 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2004). 
 107 See In re Millspaugh, 302 B.R. at 96–97; 10 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 7001.03[1].  
 108 10 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 7001.03[1]; see also In re King, 290 B.R. at 648 (defining “extent” as 
“the scope of the property encompassed by or subject to the lien”). 
 109 See In re King, 290 B.R. at 648 (citing In re Beard, 112 B.R. 951, 955 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990)). 
 110 10 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 7001.03[1] (considering and rejecting this interpretation). 
 111 Compare In re King, 290 B.R. at 646–48 (holding that Rule 3012 applies to strip-off), with In re 
Chukes, 305 B.R. at 744–45 (holding that Rule 7001 applies to strip-off). 
 112 See Lloyd & Holtschlag, supra note 23, at 68. 
 113 United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1378–80 (2010). 
 114 In re Sadala, 294 B.R. 180, 182 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003). 
 115 Id. 
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adversary proceedings and contested matters are unclear.116 Understanding the 
correct procedure to strip off is important because if the procedure is faulty, the 
lien will remain on the property for the entire amount.117 
A. Contested Matters and Adversary Proceedings 
Contested matters are “part of the main bankruptcy proceeding and have 
fewer procedural protections than adversary proceedings”; parties are 
nonetheless constitutionally entitled to notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.118 Contested matters require the debtor to provide the creditor with a 
motion or a copy of the plan.119 Usually, the debtor is not obligated to pay a 
filing fee.120 The responding party must file a response or objection to the 
motion or plan within a specific time period.121 If a creditor files a response, 
the court will set an evidentiary hearing.122 More commonly, the creditor will 
not file a response, thereby not disputing the request for relief.123 The court 
will typically resolve the matter without any hearing.124 Thus, while contested 
matters can produce trials, they provide constitutional due process cost-
effectively by not always requiring them.125  
Adversary proceedings are more formal than a contested matter.126 An 
adversary proceeding takes place in the bankruptcy court, before the same 
judge, and as part of the original bankruptcy case.127 There are significant 
filing fees required to file an adversary proceeding.128 The debtor is required to 
serve a summons and complaint on the creditor.129 The court can enter a 
 
 116 Id. 
 117 See In re Bennett, 312 B.R. 843, 846 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2004). 
 118 Ill. Dep’t of Revenue v. Ayre (In re Ayre), 360 B.R. 880, 885 (C.D. Ill. 2007). The creditor’s 
opportunity to be heard is identical in a contested matter and an adversary proceeding. See infra Part V.C–E. 
 119 See In re Sadala, 294 B.R. at 182; In re King, 290 B.R. 641, 647 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003) (noting that 
objections to plan confirmation are contested matters). 
 120 In re Sadala, 294 B.R. at 182. 
 121 Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 14 (“Debtors filing chapter 13 plans are required to mail notices to all 
parties-in-interest, giving them at least 25 days to file objections.”); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(b)(2). 
 122 In re Ayre, 360 B.R. at 885. 
 123 In re Sadala, 294 B.R. at 182. 
 124 John Ayer et al., An Overview of Bankruptcy Litigation, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2004, at 16, 16. 
 125 See In re Sadala, 294 B.R. at 182–83. 
 126 Id. 
 127 All core proceedings related to the bankruptcy take place in front of the same bankruptcy judge. 28 
U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2006). 
 128 In re Sadala, 294 B.R. at 183; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (amended 2011) (requiring $350 filing fee 
to initiate an adversary proceeding). 
 129 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004; In re Sadala, 294 B.R. at 183.  
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judgment for relief against the creditor if the creditor does not respond to the 
complaint.130 The adversary proceeding results in a judgment separate from the 
overall adjudication of the bankruptcy.131 Generally, an adversary proceeding 
is more costly and time consuming than a contested matter; however, it does 
afford additional notice.132 
B. Minority Approach: Debtors Are Required to File an Adversary 
Proceeding to Strip Off a Lien 
The minority of bankruptcy courts holds that the Bankruptcy Rules require 
an adversary proceeding to strip off wholly unsecured junior mortgages.133 
They find that creditors should be afforded a high degree of notice, as in an 
adversary proceeding, because strip-off profoundly affects creditors’ rights.134 
Most of the courts that follow the minority view believe that Rule 7001(2), 
which requires an adversary proceeding, applies to strip-off.135 Other courts 
further conclude that constitutional due process requires compliance with the 
notice provisions in the Bankruptcy Rules.136 The minority cites several 
different rationales for the adversary proceeding requirement,137 and one 
jurisdiction has even amended their local rules to require a strip-off adversary 
proceeding.138  
1. Bankruptcy Court Precedents 
The courts that require an adversary proceeding have viewed strip-off as 
obligating a determination of a lien’s priority, extent, or validity.139 These 
bankruptcy courts in the minority tend to interpret the advisory committee’s 
 
 130 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(b). 
 131 In re Sadala, 294 B.R. at 183; see also John Silas, Adversary Proceedings in Bankruptcy, PRAC. LAW., 
Jan. 1993, at 55, 55. 
 132 See In re Sadala, 294 B.R. at 182–83 (An adversary proceeding provided additional notice because 
“the debtor must file and formally serve a complaint upon the creditor.”). 
 133 See, e.g., In re Forrest, 424 B.R. 831, 833–34 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009); In re Chukes, 305 B.R. 744, 
744–45 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2004). 
 134 See In re Forrest, 424 B.R. at 833, 835. 
 135 See In re Chukes, 305 B.R. at 744–45; Pierce v. Beneficial Mortg. Co. of Utah (In re Pierce), 282 B.R. 
26, 28 (Bankr. D. Utah 2002). 
 136 See, e.g., In re Forrest, 424 B.R. at 836. 
 137  See In re Chukes, 305 B.R. at 744–45; In re Forrest, 424 B.R. at 833–35. 
 138 E.D. MICH. LBR Guideline 12. 
 139 In re Forrest, 424 B.R. at 833 (“Valuations may be appropriate for adequate protection, impairment, or 
similar purposes, but when the existence of the lien itself is at issue, then the ‘validity’ and ‘extent’ of the lien 
are certainly at issue . . . .”); In re Chukes, 305 B.R. at 744 (lien stripping affects priority). 
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notes to Rule 3012 to apply Rule 7001 to strip-off.140 The advisory 
committee’s notes state that Rule 7001 applies when the “proceeding is 
relevant to the basis of the lien itself.”141 The court in In re Chukes determined 
that the phrase “relevant to the basis of the lien itself” refers to the priority of 
the lien.142 Lien stripping affects the priority of the lien—the claim changes 
from secured to unsecured, not based solely on the value of the lien in 
question, but based rather on the lien’s priority.143 Therefore, the court 
reasoned that since Rule 7001(2) requires an adversary proceeding to 
determine the priority of the lien,144 Rule 7001(2) applies to strip-off.145 The 
court in In re Enriquez similarly held that an adversary proceeding, not a 
motion, is required to strip off but did so because it could not find any rule that 
explicitly permits using a motion to avoid a lien.146 Regardless of their 
rationale, these courts ultimately view Rule 7001(2) as governing strip-offs.147 
Other courts have expanded the Rule 7001(2) analysis by finding a 
constitutional dimension in the statutory requirements.148 The court in In re 
Forrest held that strip-off requires an adversary proceeding because both Rule 
7001(2) and the Constitution require it.149 The Forrest court concluded that 
when the Bankruptcy Rules require an adversary proceeding, constitutional 
due process entitles the creditor to heightened notice through the filing of a 
summons and complaint.150 To come to this holding, the Forrest court relied 
heavily on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Hanson, a student loan 
 
 140 See, e.g., In re Chukes, 305 B.R. at 744 (“The Advisory Committee Note (1983) to Rule 3012 states 
that ‘[a]n adversary proceeding is commenced when the validity, priority, or extent of a lien is at issue as 
prescribed by Rule 7001,’ and characterizes such matters as ‘relevant to the basis of the lien itself’ in contrast 
to valuation under Rule 3012.” (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012 advisory committee’s 
notes)). 
 141 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012 advisory committee’s notes. 
 142 Id., construed in In re Chukes, 305 B.R. at 744. 
 143 In re Chukes, 305 B.R. at 744 (“[I]f the relief sought in the proceeding turns in part on the priority of 
the lien, the proceeding is an adversary proceeding by reason of Rule 7001(2), and it must be commenced by 
the filing of a complaint under Rule 7003, not a motion under Rule 3012.”). 
 144 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(2). 
 145 See In re Chukes, 305 B.R. at 744–45. 
 146 In re Enriquez, 244 B.R. 156, 158 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Zimmer v. 
PSB Lending Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 147 See, e.g., Pierce v. Beneficial Mortg. Co. of Utah (In re Pierce), 282 B.R. 26, 28 (Bankr. D. Utah 2002) 
(stating that the plain language of Rule 7001(2) requires an adversary proceeding to achieve strip-off). 
 148 See In re Forrest, 424 B.R. 831, 834–35 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 834. 
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case.151 The Supreme Court’s decision in Espinosa effectively overruled 
Hanson, holding that constitutional due process does not require strict 
compliance with the notice provisions in the Bankruptcy Rules.152 This 
weakens the minority’s argument that an adversary proceeding is required.153 
2. Eastern District of Michigan Local Rules: Guideline 12 
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
amended its local rules in 2009 to require adversary proceedings in certain 
circumstances to strip off liens.154 The local rule is known as “Guideline 12,” 
and it codifies additional procedures for strip-off.155 Under the rule, if the 
debtor and creditor agree to the strip-off, they may file a stipulation and enter a 
proposed order, which will allow the parties to avoid an adversary 
proceeding.156 If no agreement is reached, the debtor must instigate an 
adversary proceeding but is exempt from the adversary proceeding filing 
fee.157 Guideline 12 demonstrates a compromise between two competing 
policies discussed above—the creditor’s notice and the debtor’s ability to 
easily strip off a lien—but does not solve all the problems that requiring an 
adversary proceeding creates. The additional time requirements and the 
increased leverage provided to creditors still pose policy problems.158 
C. Majority Approach: Debtors Are Not Required to File an Adversary 
Proceeding to Strip Off a Lien 
The majority of bankruptcy courts holds that an adversary proceeding is not 
required to strip off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage.159 The majority 
justifies this holding by asserting that the plain meaning of Rule 7001(2) and 
the advisory committee’s intent demonstrate that Rule 7001(2) does not apply 
 
 151 Id. at 834–35 (citing In re Hanson, 397 F.3d 482, 486–87 (7th Cir. 2005), overruled by United Student 
Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010)). 
 152 See Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1378; see also In re Ginther, 427 B.R. 450, 456–57 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) 
(“Espinosa clarified that the Bankruptcy Rules are procedural rules, and therefore overruled In re Hanson, 
which had held that constitutional due process required compliance with notice provisions in the Rules.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 153 Infra Part III.A. 
 154 E.D. MICH. LBR Guideline 12. 
 155 See id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 See id. 
 158 Infra Part V.A–B. 
 159 In re Robert, 313 B.R. 545, 549 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2004) (listing cases adopting the majority view). 
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to strip-off.160 The majority additionally argues that the minority’s 
interpretation of Rule 7001(2) is in conflict with Rule 3012.161 Courts in this 
majority seem to agree that property valuation under Rule 3012 is the key to 
strip-off.162 However, there is a divide within the majority: courts do not agree 
about which kind of contested matter is required.163 One group allows strip-off 
by motion, while the other allows strip-off through the chapter 13 plan 
confirmation process.164 A third group has allowed strip-off by either 
process.165 For both statutory and policy reasons, this Comment takes the 
position that only a Rule 3012 motion is required to strip off a junior 
mortgage.166  
1. The Majority Interpretation: An Adversary Proceeding Is Not Required 
In re King illustrates the majority’s position that a debtor is not required to 
file an adversary proceeding to strip off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage.167 
The debtors were a married couple who filed for bankruptcy under chapter 
13.168 The debtors’ chapter 13 schedules stated that the value of their primary 
residence was $38,000.169 They owed Key Bank $40,000 for their first 
mortgage and owed $48,000 to Bank One for their second mortgage.170 The 
court mailed a § 341 meeting notice and a copy of the chapter 13 plan to Bank 
One.171 The plan proposed to avoid Bank One’s wholly unsecured second 
mortgage.172 The § 341 notice stated that “[a]ny party objecting to 
confirmation must appear at the confirmation hearing to have their objection 
considered.”173  
Bank One neither appeared at the § 341 meeting nor objected to the 
debtors’ plan, which the court subsequently confirmed.174 Three months after 
 
 160 See In re King, 290 B.R. 641, 648 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003). 
 161 In re Hoskins, 262 B.R. 693, 696–97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2001). 
 162 See In re Bennett, 312 B.R. 843, 847–48 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2004). 
 163 See Lloyd & Holtschlag, supra note 23, at 68.  
 164 Id. 
 165 In re Millspaugh, 302 B.R. 90, 98 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003).  
 166 Infra Parts IV, V. 
 167 See In re King, 290 B.R. 641, 647–48 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003). 
 168 Id. at 643. 
 169 Id. at 644. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) (2006) (“Within a reasonable time after the order for relief in a case 
under this title, the United States trustee shall convene and preside at a meeting of creditors.”). 
 172 In re King, 290 B.R. at 644. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
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the plan’s confirmation, Bank One objected, arguing that, procedurally, the 
confirmation of the plan was inadequate to strip off a wholly unsecured junior 
mortgage.175 Bank One argued that Rule 7001(2) requires an adversary 
proceeding to strip off, even while acknowledging that “the issue turns 
primarily on the value of the real estate.”176 The court found that the scope of 
Rule 7001(2) does not include valuation.177 Rule 7001(2) only requires an 
adversary proceeding “to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a 
lien.”178 
The court reasoned that the debtors’ avoidance of Bank One’s lien was 
based on the valuation process of § 506(a), which is “required to be made in 
conjunction with the hearing ‘on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.’”179 
The value of the secured property establishes the claim’s secured status.180 If 
the § 506(a) valuation process determines that the lien is wholly unsecured, 
§ 506(d) voids the lien.181 The court held that Rule 3012 only requires a 
contested matter to strip off a junior mortgage.182 
The majority raises another point to support its view that Rule 7001 does 
not apply to strip-offs. Courts in the minority argue that strip-off proceedings 
are to determine the “validity priority, or extent” of the lien pursuant to Rule 
7001(2).183 The majority asserts, however, that the advisory committee’s notes 
to Rule 3012 disclaimed this interpretation.184 The notes state: 
An adversary proceeding is commenced when the validity, priority, 
or extent of a lien is at issue as prescribed by Rule 7001. That 
 
 175 Id. at 645. Bank One made three additional arguments for why the debtor’s liens should not be stripped 
off: (1) it did not receive adequate notice because the debtors did not use the correct address; (2) the Supreme 
Court in Nobelman disallowed strip-off of even wholly unsecured mortgages; and (3) the debtors acted in bad 
faith by filing a chapter 13 plan almost two months after receiving a chapter 7 discharge. The court rejected all 
of these arguments and denied Bank One’s motion. Id. at 645–46, 648–51.  
 176 Id. at 647–48. 
 177 Id. at 648. 
 178 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(2); In re King, 290 B.R. at 648 (“[T]he term ‘validity’ means the existence or 
legitimacy of the lien itself, ‘priority’ means the lien’s relationship to other claims to or interests in the 
collateral, and ‘extent’ means the scope of the property encompassed by or subject to the lien.” (citing In re 
Beard, 112 B.R. 951, 955 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990))). 
 179 In re King, 290 B.R. at 648 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006)). 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 506(d)). 
 182 Id. 
 183 See, e.g., In re Chukes, 305 B.R. 744, 744 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2004); Pierce v. Beneficial Mortg. Co. of 
Utah (In re Pierce), 282 B.R. 26, 28 (Bankr. D. Utah 2002). 
 184 In re Robert, 313 B.R. 545, 549–50 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Sadala, 294 B.R. 180, 182–83 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003). 
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proceeding is relevant to the basis of the lien itself while valuation 
under Rule 3012 would be for the purposes indicated above [e.g., to 
determine the issue of adequate protection, impairment, or treatment 
of the claim in a plan.]185 
The advisory committee’s notes declare that an adversary proceeding is only 
required when the “basis of the lien itself” is in dispute.186 In the view of the 
majority courts, since strip-off does not examine the lien’s “existence or 
legitimacy,” the lien’s “superiority in rank or position,” or “the [specific] 
property encompassed by or subject to the lien” but rather looks at “the extent 
to which the claims of the mortgagee are secured,” valuing and avoiding a 
wholly unsecured lien does not require an adversary proceeding.187 Therefore, 
Rule 7001(2) most likely does not apply to strip-off. 
2. Whether a Debtor Can Strip Off a Lien Using a Chapter 13 Plan or 
Motion 
Courts adopting the majority approach agree that strip-off does not require 
an adversary proceeding.188 However, these bankruptcy courts differ in their 
determination of the best method to achieve strip-off—through a plan 
confirmation process, through a motion, or through either.189 Those courts 
allowing strip-off through plan confirmation rely on § 1327(c) to discharge the 
wholly unsecured lien, whereas the courts allowing strip-off by a Rule 3012 
motion rely primarily on § 506(d).190 
Courts allowing strip-off through the plan confirmation process do not 
require a Rule 3012 motion.191 These courts reason that the discharge of the 
wholly unsecured lien can be achieved through the “combined operation of 
§§ 506(a), 1322(b)(2), 1325(a)(5), 1327(b) and (c).”192 The courts explain that 
strip-off in chapter 13 cases can be achieved through “valuation under 
§ 506(a), modification under § 1322(b)(2), lien retention under § 1325(a)(5)[,] 
 
 185 In re Robert, 313 B.R. at 549 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012 advisory 
committee’s notes). 
 186 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012 advisory committee’s notes; see also In re Robert, 313 B.R. at 549–50.  
 187 See, e.g., In re Robert, 313 B.R. at 549–50. 
 188 Lloyd & Holtschlag, supra note 23, at 68. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 See Pees v. DAN Joint Venture II (In re Claar), 368 B.R. 670, 677–78 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007); In re 
Hill, 304 B.R. 800, 803–04 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003). 
 192 In re Claar, 368 B.R. at 677–78. 
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and vesting free and clear under § 1327(b) and (c).”193 However, this argument 
is unpersuasive because regardless of the provision used to discharge the lien, 
§ 506(a) requires a valuation to determine if the junior lien is wholly 
unsecured.194 Because Rule 3012 requires a motion to “determine the value of 
a claim secured by a lien,”195 a Rule 3012 motion is at some point required to 
strip off the lien. 
Other courts have treated the plan itself as a de facto motion, thus finding 
Rule 3012 satisfied by the plan rather than requiring a separate motion.196 The 
court in In re Hoskins held that there is “no rationale why a separate piece of 
paper is required if the plan itself contains sufficient information to alert [the 
creditor] that [the creditor’s] claim is in some jeopardy.”197 The court reasoned 
that a “conventional” motion served the same function as the plan in the 
adjudication of disputes.198 Therefore, because the plan is essentially a motion, 
the Rule 3012 motion requirement is satisfied.199 The court in In re Fuller 
followed the same reasoning and held that a plan can serve the same purpose 
as a motion.200 A plan contains several requests for relief, which are 
adjudicated through confirmation.201 
The reasoning of a motion-by-confirmation as illustrated in Hoskins is 
faulty. Courts that allow strip-off through the plan argue that Rule 7001(2)’s 
adversary proceeding requirement does not apply because Rule 7001(2), 
broadly construed, would conflict with Rule 3012.202 It is illogical for courts to 
claim that Rule 7001(2) does not apply to strip-off because it conflicts with 
Rule 3012 and then conclude that Rule 3012 does not apply either.203 The text 
 
 193 Id. at 678; see also In re Hill, 304 B.R. at 803–04 (coming to a similar conclusion, though placing 
much of the emphasis on § 1327(c) plan confirmation). 
 194 See In re Claar, 368 B.R. at 677–78; In re Hill, 304 B.R. at 803–04. 
 195 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012. 
 196 In re Bennett, 312 B.R. 843, 846 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2004) (listing courts adopting the motion-by-
confirmation theory); see also In re Hoskins, 262 B.R. 693, 697 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2001); In re Fuller, 255 
B.R. 300, 306 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2000). 
 197 In re Hoskins, 262 B.R. at 697. 
 198 Id. at 697–98; see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(f) (treating objections to plan confirmation as 
contested matters “governed by Rule 9014”); id. 9014(a) (“In a contested matter not otherwise governed by 
these rules, relief shall be requested by motion, and reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing shall be 
afforded the party against whom relief is sought.”). 
 199 In re Hoskins, 262 B.R. at 697. 
 200 In re Fuller, 255 B.R. at 306. 
 201 Id. 
 202 See, e.g., In re Hoskins, 262 B.R. at 696–98.  
 203 See id.  
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of Rule 3012 explicitly requires a “motion of any party in interest.”204 If 
Congress intended the satisfaction of Rule 3012 by the plan confirmation 
process, then Congress would not have required a motion. If a court holds that 
the plan can serve the same purpose as a Rule 3012 motion, then this would be 
an example of the judiciary overreaching into the domain of the legislature. 
The most credible reasoning therefore leads to the conclusion that a debtor 
must use a Rule 3012 motion to strip off a lien.205 The court in In re Bennett 
articulated that § 506 valuation is the core principle of strip-off.206 Rule 3012 
states that “[t]he court may determine the value of a claim secured by a lien on 
property . . . on motion of any party in interest.”207 Further, the advisory 
committee’s notes to Rule 3012 only address the use of motions, suggesting it 
is the preferred, perhaps even exclusive, method for conducting a § 506(a) 
valuation.208 Because strip-off cannot occur without determining whether the 
junior mortgage is an allowed secured claim under § 506(a), a Rule 3012 
motion is necessary to strip off the mortgage.209  
3. Due Process Requirements210 
Regardless of whether a majority jurisdiction requires a motion or a chapter 
13 plan to strip off, another important issue is whether either meets the 
standards of due process. Due process ensures that creditors have notice and 
the ability to object to a debtor’s attempted strip-off.211 As the court in In re 
Dickey warned, “[S]trip[ping] off mortgages without adequate notice 
contributes to the perception that the bankruptcy system is little more than a 
procedural jungle in which the parties engage in guerilla tactics, laying 
camouflaged traps to catch tactical missteps by unwary or distracted 
 
 204 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012. 
 205 See In re Bennett, 312 B.R. 843, 847–48 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2004) (holding that a debtor may use a 
motion to strip off a lien even after recognizing that “there [was] precedent allowing lien stripping through a 
plan”). 
 206 In re Bennett, 312 B.R. at 847. 
 207 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012; In re Bennett, 312 B.R. at 847. 
 208 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012 advisory committee’s notes (“This rule permits the issue [of valuing 
secured claims] to be raised on motion by a party in interest.”). 
 209 See In re Bennett, 312 B.R. at 847; FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012 advisory committee’s notes. 
 210 This section owes a great deal, both intellectually and structurally, to Lloyd & Holtschlag, supra note 
23, at 68–69. 
 211 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
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creditors.”212 Therefore, courts must be careful to ensure that the strip-off 
notice procedures comply with constitutional standards of due process. 
The Supreme Court outlined the constitutional requirements for due 
process in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.213 The Court held 
that notice must be “reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested parties of 
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections.”214 Bankruptcy courts have applied the Mullane standard to the 
notice procedures for strip-off and found that due process has both qualitative 
and quantitative aspects.215 A creditor whose lien is vulnerable to strip-off 
must have a “reasonable time in which to respond” and be made aware of “the 
extent of the adverse effect[s] on the [creditor’s] rights.”216 
a. The Quantitative Requirement 
The quantitative, or timing, requirement obligates the court to give a 
creditor a reasonable time to consider the plan’s terms and respond or object as 
needed.217 The quantitative requirement is fulfilled by Rule 2002(b), which 
requires twenty-eight days notice of a chapter 13 plan confirmation.218 If the 
debtor gives the creditor twenty-eight days notice of a plan that contains a 
strip-off provision, then the creditor will have constitutionally sufficient time 
to object.219 
Some courts that allow a strip-off motion also rely on Rule 2002(b) to 
comply with the quantitative requirement.220 The court in In re Bennett 
required that debtors file a strip-off motion with the plan.221 The court cannot 
confirm a debtor’s plan without adjudication of the strip-off,222 and to confirm 
 
 212 Dickey v. Beneficial Fin. (In re Dickey), 293 B.R. 360, 363 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2003), quoted in Lloyd 
& Holtschlag, supra note 23, at 68. 
 213 See Mullane, 339 U.S. 306. 
 214 Id. at 314. 
 215 In re Yekel, No. 305-47107-tmb13, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2208, at *11–12 (Bankr. D. Or. Sept. 14, 
2006) (quoting In re King, 290 B.R. 641, 649 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003)). 
 216 In re King, 290 B.R. at 649 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. 306). 
 217 In re Dickey, 293 B.R. at 363. 
 218 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(b); Lloyd & Holtschlag, supra note 23, at 68. 
 219 The court in In re King found that the then statutorily required twenty-five days to respond was a 
constitutionally valid “minimum notice period.” Therefore, other courts should find twenty-eight days notice 
to have even greater validity. See In re King, 290 B.R. at 649. 
 220 See In re Bennett, 312 B.R. 843, 848 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2004). 
 221 Id. 
 222 See Lloyd & Holtschlag, supra note 23, at 68. 
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a plan the court must comply with the Code’s provisions.223 Because § 506(a) 
valuation is required for strip-off, the court must make a decision regarding 
valuation before plan confirmation.224 Therefore, if the strip-off motion is filed 
with the plan, then Rule 2002(b) gives the creditor twenty-eight days notice to 
object.225 
b. The Qualitative Requirement 
Satisfaction of the qualitative requirement depends on whether the plan 
provision or motion makes the creditor aware of the strip-off’s impact.226 The 
qualitative aspect of strip-off, then, requires that service of the motion or plan 
be “reasonably calculated” to reach the debtor and that language of the 
provision sufficiently alerts the creditor of the strip-off.227 The court in In re 
Millspaugh held that the debtors must serve the motion or plan on the creditor 
pursuant to Rule 9014(b).228 Rule 9014(b) requires the debtor to serve the 
creditor in compliance with Rule 7004.229 Rule 7004 also governs the service 
of adversary proceedings, and therefore service of the strip-off motion or plan 
will provide the same qualitative notice as an adversary proceeding.230  
The language of the plan or motion must “make clear and conspicuous the 
proposed treatment of the creditor’s claim and the factual and legal basis for 
such treatment.”231 The burden is on the debtor to ensure the language of the 
plan or motion provides sufficient notice of the strip-off.232 The courts have 
outlined several provisions that would satisfy qualitative due process for a 
strip-off.233 The court in In re Bennett asserted that the plan or motion must 
include: (1) the name of the creditor, (2) the “subject real property,” (3) a legal 
description of the property, (4) a statement that the debtor plans to strip off the 
 
 223 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) (2006). 
 224 Lloyd & Holtschlag, supra note 23, at 68. 
 225 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(b). 
 226 See In re King, 290 B.R. 641, 649 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003). 
 227 Lloyd & Holtschlag, supra note 23, at 68; see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 314 (1950).  
 228 In re Millspaugh, 302 B.R. 90, 101 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003), cited in Lloyd & Holtschlag, supra note 
23, at 68.  
 229 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(b) (referencing FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004); see also In re Millspaugh, 302 B.R. 
at 101 (“Rule 9014, by direct internal reference, requires service in contested maters to be made consistent 
with Rule 7004.”). 
 230 See Lloyd & Holtschlag, supra note 23, at 68–69. 
 231 In re Millspaugh, 302 B.R. at 99. 
 232 In re Bennett, 312 B.R. 843, 848 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2004). 
 233 See Lloyd & Holtschlag, supra note 23, at 69. 
MCCREADY GALLEYSFINAL 6/6/2012 11:48 AM 
486 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28 
creditor’s wholly unsecured junior mortgage and treat the stripped-off 
mortgage as an unsecured claim, and (5) calculations that demonstrate the 
creditor’s mortgage is wholly unsecured.234 In In re Bennett, the court 
concluded that if each of these components were included in the plan or 
motion, the creditor would receive “sufficient information and description” to 
determine that the debtor planned to strip off their lien.235 
Courts hold that strip-off by either motion or plan conforms to 
constitutional due process if the proper procedures are followed.236 The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Espinosa supported this assertion and further 
applied the Mullane “reasonably calculated” standard for constitutionally 
sufficient due process to bankruptcy reorganizations.237 The Mullane standard 
is so minimal that by following the Code requirements, a strip-off motion or 
plan exceeds the notice that is constitutionally required.238 Therefore, an 
adversary proceeding is not required to meet constitutional muster. 
III.  HOW THE ESPINOSA DECISION APPLIES TO STRIP-OFF 
Neither the Supreme Court nor any of the federal courts of appeal have 
decided if an adversary proceeding is required to strip off a wholly unsecured 
residential mortgage.239 In Espinosa, however, the Supreme Court determined 
whether an adversary proceeding is required as a matter of due process in the 
context of student loans.240 Although different Code sections govern student 
loan and strip-off cases, both cases involve strong due process 
considerations.241 Because the Code provides additional protections to student 
loan and residential mortgage lenders, these creditors believe that their loans 
are immune from discharge.242 Both student loan discharges and strip-offs 
allow debtors to circumvent the extra protections of the Code to discharge 
these debts.243 Therefore, it is paramount that courts ensure due process 
protections are met for these types of creditors. Adversary proceedings clearly 
 
 234 In re Bennett, 312 B.R. at 848, quoted in Lloyd & Holtschlag, supra note 23, at 69.  
 235 Id. 
 236 See In re Millspaugh, 302 B.R. at 98–99. 
 237 See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1378–80 (2010). 
 238 Carlson, supra note 31, at 252. 
 239 See Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 14 n.8 (mentioning that only one circuit opinion has addressed the 
issue and then only in dicta). 
 240 See Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1373. 
 241 Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 81.  
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. 
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provide the necessary due process to student loan and residential mortgage 
creditors; however, it is unknown whether other methods can provide sufficient 
protections.244 
The Supreme Court in Espinosa made two important assertions that apply 
to the notice requirement for strip-off, each of which will be examined further 
below.245 First, the Court suggested that the Mullane standard—not the 
bankruptcy rules of procedure—sets the constitutional minimum for due 
process in bankruptcy.246 Second, the majority in Espinosa declared that res 
judicata can bar the appeal of a confirmed plan which did not initiate an 
adversary proceeding as required by the Rules.247 These two important 
assertions, combined with other language in the Espinosa decision, support the 
majority approach that an adversary proceeding is not required to strip off a 
lien.248 
A. The Precedential Value of Espinosa 
It is important to understand the rationale of the Espinosa decision to 
comprehend how it applies to strip-offs. Francisco Espinosa filed a chapter 13 
petition and proposed a plan providing for payment of $13,250 in student loans 
to United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (“United”).249 Espinosa’s plan offered to 
repay only the principal on his student loan debt, with the remainder being 
discharged.250 Both the Code and Bankruptcy Rules require the finding of 
undue hardship and an adversary proceeding in such a situation.251 Pursuant to 
the Bankruptcy Rules, the bankruptcy court mailed notice of Espinosa’s 
bankruptcy and his plan to United.252 United did not object that Espinosa failed 
to demonstrate that paying his student loan interest caused him undue 
 
 244 Id. 
 245 See Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1378–80; see also Carlson, supra note 31, at 294–95. 
 246 Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1378; Carlson, supra note 31, at 294. Espinosa thus effectively overturned a 
number of lower courts that found that “where the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules require a 
heightened degree of notice, due process entitles a party to receive such notice before an order binding the 
party will be afforded preclusive effect.” See, e.g., In re Forrest, 424 B.R. 831, 834 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(quoting In re Hanson, 397 F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir. 2005), overruled by Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 247 Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1380; Carlson, supra note 31, at 259.  
 248 See Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1378–80. 
 249 Id. at 1373–74. 
 250 Id. at 1374. 
 251 See Nickolas Karavolas, Note, Heightened Notice Means Heightened Problems: Due Process Notice 
Concerns When Discharging Student Loan Debts Under Chapter 13, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 225, 252–53 (2008). 
 252 Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1374. 
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hardship.253 Additionally, United did not object to Espinosa’s failure to initiate 
the required adversary proceeding to determine the interest’s 
dischargeablility.254 After the bankruptcy court confirmed Espinosa’s plan 
without holding an adversary proceeding or making a finding of undue 
hardship, the bankruptcy trustee advised United that its claim would be treated 
as set forth in the plan.255 Espinosa completed the plan payments and received 
a discharge.256 
Three years later, the U.S. Department of Education, as assignee to  
Espinosa’s loans,257 attempted to collect Espinosa’s unpaid interest.258 After 
recalling the loans, United filed a motion which sought to void the bankruptcy 
court’s order confirming Espinosa’s plan.259 United made two arguments: (1) 
that Espinosa’s failure to file an adversary proceeding violated United’s due 
process rights; and (2) that Espinosa’s plan violated both the Code and the 
Bankruptcy Rules because Espinosa failed to demonstrate undue hardship or 
initiate an adversary proceeding.260 The Supreme Court found both of these 
arguments unpersuasive and upheld the discharge of Espinosa’s student 
loans.261 
1. Mullane Sets the Constitutional Standard in Bankruptcy 
The Supreme Court found that Espinosa’s failure to file an adversary 
proceeding did not violate United’s due process rights.262 This holding has 
important implications for whether an adversary proceeding is required for 
strip-off.263 Espinosa’s failure to comply with the adversary proceeding 
requirement “deprived United of a right granted by a procedural rule.”264 
 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. at 1374 n.3 (“After Espinosa completed payments under the plan, United assigned Espinosa’s loans 
to the Department under a reinsurance agreement. After these proceedings began, United requested and 
received a recall of the loans from the Department.”). 
 258 Id. at 1374.  
 259 Id. at 1374 & n.3. 
 260 Id. at 1374–75. 
 261 Id. at 1378–80. 
 262 Id. at 1378. 
 263 See In re Ginther, 427 B.R. 450, 456–57 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (“Espinosa clarified that the 
Bankruptcy Rules are procedural rules, and therefore overruled In re Hanson, which had held that 
constitutional due process required compliance with notice provisions in the Rules.” (citations omitted)).  
 264 Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1378; see also Karen Cordry, Espinosa: It’s Not So Simple (pt. 1), 29 AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2010, at 12, 70 (“[I]n Espinosa, the Supreme Court made a sweeping statement 
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United could have objected to Espinosa’s failure to file an adversary 
proceeding on procedural grounds.265 Failure to file an adversary proceeding, 
however, was not a violation of United’s constitutional due process rights.266 
The Supreme Court cited the Mullane standard of notice—“reasonably 
calculated . . . to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections”—as the minimum 
required for due process in this situation.267 The Court noted that United 
received actual notice because the plan had been mailed to United, thus 
notifying the lender of the plan’s filing and contents.268  
The Espinosa holding favors the majority approach of not requiring an 
adversary proceeding.269 Some courts had determined that an adversary 
proceeding is always the due process minimum if it is required by the Rules.270 
This understanding stems from the 1953 Supreme Court decision, City of New 
York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co.271 However, in 
Espinosa the Supreme Court indicated that the Mullane standard could set the 
constitutional bar lower than what is required by the statute.272 The Court’s 
assertion supports the majority because even if an adversary proceeding is 
required in the relevant jurisdiction, the constitutional minimum is still met by 
submitting a copy of the plan or a motion to the creditor.273 If an adversary 
 
that the failure to serve the summons and complaint merely ‘deprived [the lender] of a right granted by a 
procedural rule’ and that the deprivation of proper notice did not violate its constitutional right to due process.” 
(quoting Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1378)). 
 265 Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1378.  
 266 Id.  
 267 Id. (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)); see also Carlson, 
supra note 31, at 294 (“In Espinosa, the Supreme Court indicates that Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co. sets the [constitutional] minimum [in bankruptcy].” (footnote omitted)). 
 268 Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1378. It is important to note that, because the creditor in Espinosa received 
actual notice, the Court does not explicitly address what would happen if a creditor received less than actual 
notice. 
 269 See supra Part II.C. 
 270 See SLW Capital, LLC v. Mansaray-Ruffin (In re Mansaray-Ruffin), 530 F.3d 230, 242 (3d Cir. 
2008); In re Hanson, 397 F.3d 482, 486–87 (7th Cir. 2005), overruled by Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367. 
 271 Carlson, supra note 31, at 258–59 (“‘[E]ven creditors who have knowledge of a reorganization have a 
right to assume that the statutory “reasonable notice” will be given them before their claims are forever 
barred.’ [This] sentence . . . has been taken to mean that the procedural rules governing in bankruptcy set the 
constitutional minimum for creditors.” (emphasis added) (quoting City of New York v. N.Y., New Haven & 
Hartford. R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 297 (1953))).  
 272 Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1378 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).  
 273 See Carlson, supra note 31, at 294 (“[The Espinosa Court] indicates that Mullane . . . sets the 
[constitutional] minimum [for due process]. Mullane requires notice by mail whenever the plaintiff knows the 
name and location of a defendant. The due process standard may in fact be even lower in chapter 13 cases, 
given the mechanical nature of the deadlines for plan confirmation.”). 
MCCREADY GALLEYSFINAL 6/6/2012 11:48 AM 
490 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28 
proceeding was required for strip-off and the debtor did not file for this 
proceeding but rather sent the creditor a copy of the plan, then the debtor did 
not violate the creditor’s constitutional due process rights.274 Espinosa reminds 
us that violating the procedural right of notice is not necessarily synonymous 
with violating a constitutional right.275 Therefore, any argument by the 
minority that strip-off through a plan or motion does not comport with 
constitutional due process276 is unfounded. 
2. Res Judicata Bars the Appeal of a Confirmed Plan That Did Not Follow 
the Adversary Proceeding Requirement 
The Supreme Court held that Espinosa’s failure to commence an adversary 
proceeding and demonstrate undue hardship was legal error.277 However, 
because Espinosa’s failure was legal error and not constitutional or 
jurisdictional error, there was no basis to void Espinosa’s confirmation 
order.278 The Supreme Court stated that this legal error could have been 
successfully contested through the plan confirmation process, but United failed 
to take such action.279 The Supreme Court asserted that a confirmation order is 
not void merely because it is erroneous.280 A judgment entered without 
adequate service falls under FRCP 60(b)(4), which mandates that courts grant 
relief from void judgments regardless of when the issue is raised.281 FRCP 
60(b)(4) “applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either 
on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that 
deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.”282 The Supreme 
 
 274 See Carlson, supra note 31, at 294.  
 275 Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1378 (“Espinosa’s failure to serve United with a summons and complaint 
deprived United of a right granted by a procedural rule. . . . But this deprivation did not amount to a violation 
of United’s constitutional right to due process.”). 
 276 See In re Forrest, 424 B.R. 831, 832 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009); infra Part II.B.1. 
 277 Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1375–80. 
 278 Id. at 1380.  
 279 See id. United could have made a direct attack against Espinosa because of his failure to make an 
undue hardship showing; however, a direct attack could no longer be made once the plan was confirmed. 
United therefore attempted a collateral attack on the confirmation order as void due to an alleged violation of 
United’s due process rights. See Kenneth N. Klee, Professor Kenneth N. Klee on the Supreme Court’s holding 
in United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 2010 LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS 4966, at 2–3 
(2010). 
 280 Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1377.  
 281 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4) (“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . the judgment is 
void . . . .”); Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1376–77 (noting that FRCP 60(b)(4) applies when there is a problem with 
jurisdiction or “a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard”).  
 282 Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1377. 
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Court in Espinosa held that FRCP 60(b)(4) did not apply because there was 
neither a jurisdictional error nor a violation of due process.283 Since United had 
notice of the plan and failed to object, United was barred from appeal.284 The 
Supreme Court clarified that res judicata barred any collateral attack by United 
after confirmation.285 
This holding in Espinosa has a major impact on whether an adversary 
proceeding is required to strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien. Returning to 
the hypothetical discussed above, suppose the market value of Henry’s home is 
$400,000, and he still owes $350,000 to Secured Bank and an additional 
$250,000 to Junior Bank. Both Secured and Junior Banks file proof of claims. 
Henry proposes a plan to strip off Junior Bank’s mortgage. This plan is in 
violation of § 1322(b)(2) and is illegal under the Code.286 Henry does not file 
an adversary proceeding but serves a motion on Junior Bank. Junior Bank fails 
to object to the illegal lien-strip and the court approves the plan. In the 
minority of jurisdictions, this motion would be considered insufficient,287 and 
prior to Espinosa, many courts would have held res judicata had no effect on a 
confirmed plan that violated the Rules by not filing an adversary proceeding.288 
Espinosa abrogated these opinions because Espinosa upholds some illegal 
chapter 13 plans based solely on res judicata.289 Therefore, Junior Bank cannot 
mount a collateral attack against Henry after confirmation. 
The Supreme Court’s holding damages the effectiveness of the adversary 
proceeding requirement. Adversary proceedings are required by the minority to 
give creditors more notice to contest a strip-off.290 After Espinosa, if a 
bankruptcy judge confirms a strip-off in a jurisdiction where an adversary 
proceeding is required and “reasonably calculated” notice is given, but no 
adversary proceeding is initiated, then res judicata bars the appeal after the 
debt is discharged.291  
 
 283 Id.  
 284 Id. at 1380. 
 285 Carlson, supra note 31, at 295. 
 286 See Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (holding that a junior mortgage that is 
supported by some equity is partially secured and cannot be stripped off). 
 287 See In re Chukes, 305 B.R. 744, 744–45 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2004); Pierce v. Beneficial Mortg. Co. of 
Utah (In re Pierce), 282 B.R. 26, 28 (Bankr. D. Utah 2002). 
 288 Carlson, supra note 31, at 255; see also SLW Capital, LLC v. Mansaray-Ruffin (In re Mansaray-
Ruffin), 530 F.3d 230, 238–39 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 289 Carlson, supra note 31, at 283–84; see also Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1380.  
 290 See Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 14. 
 291 See Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1378. 
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B. Espinosa Can Support the Minority’s Position if Rule 7001 Applies 
Some aspects of the Espinosa decision support the minority position, 
especially if Bankruptcy Rule 7001 applies to strip-off and an adversary 
proceeding is required. The Espinosa Court overruled the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding “that bankruptcy courts must confirm a plan proposing the discharge of 
a student loan debt without a determination of undue hardship in an adversary 
proceeding unless the creditor timely raises a specific objection.”292 Instead, 
the Court held that, in those situations, a bankruptcy court should not confirm a 
plan when it knows that a procedural rule was violated.293 The court in In re 
Peckens-Schmitt explained that “the Supreme Court [in Espinosa] clearly 
stated that 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) ‘requires bankruptcy courts to address and 
correct a defect in a debtor’s proposed plan even if no creditor raises the 
issue.’”294 Thus, the Code requires bankruptcy courts to compel the debtor’s 
plan to follow the Bankruptcy Rules.295 However, as highlighted above, if the 
bankruptcy court does confirm a plan regardless of its obligation not to, the 
creditor is barred from appeal because of res judicata.296 
The obligation of judges not to confirm a plan that violates the Bankruptcy 
Rules even if the creditor fails to object should act as a strong deterrent.297 The 
Espinosa decision will compel most judges to deny plans that conflict with the 
Bankruptcy Rules.298 The holding is important as to whether an adversary 
proceeding is required to strip off a mortgage. If the minority approach is right 
and Bankruptcy Rule 7001 applies to strip-off, bankruptcy courts would be 
obligated to deny a plan that does not initiate an adversary proceeding even if 
no creditor objects.299 Therefore, it is imperative to determine if Bankruptcy 
Rule 7001 applies to the strip-off of a wholly unsecured junior mortgage. 
 
 292 Id. at 1380–81. 
 293 In re Peckens-Schmitt, No. DK 10-04164, 2010 WL 2851520, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. July 16, 
2010) (quoting Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1381 n.14 (2010)). 
 294 Id. (quoting Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1381 n.14 (2010)). 
 295 Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1381 & n.14 (2010); In re Peckens-Schmitt, 2010 WL 2851520, at *1–2. 
 296 See Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1380.  
 297 In re Peckens-Schmitt, 2010 WL 2851520, at *2 (“The court does not believe that Espinosa authorizes 
the court to turn a blind eye to the procedural shortcut that the Debtor proposes in her Plan . . . .”). 
 298 See Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1381 & n.14. 
 299 See In re Peckens-Schmitt, 2010 WL 2851520, at *1–2. 
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IV.  WHY THE MAJORITY VIEW REPRESENTS THE CORRECT STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
The split between the bankruptcy courts suggests that the Code and 
Bankruptcy Rules are ambiguous as to whether strip-off requires an adversary 
proceeding. Specifically, the jurisdictions disagree about whether Congress 
meant for Rule 7001(2) or for Rule 3012 to apply to the strip-off of a wholly 
unsecured junior mortgage. However, the language of the statute, combined 
with the advisory committee’s intent, indicate that Rule 3012, not Rule 7001, 
applies to strip-off. Therefore, strip-off requires a 3012 motion and not an 
adversary proceeding. 
A. Applying Statutory Canons of Construction to Rules 3012 and 7001 
Statutory interpretation begins with an inquiry into the language of the 
statute.300 One must determine whether the statutory language is clear or 
ambiguous.301 If the meaning of the statute is “clear and unambiguous . . . that 
would be the end of [the court’s] analysis.”302 However, when the statute’s 
meaning is ambiguous, one must look to other indicators to “determine 
whether ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’”303 “[A]mbiguity of 
statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the 
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the 
statute as a whole.”304 A statute is facially ambiguous if a reading of its text 
can lead to at least two plausible interpretations.305 
1. Application to Rule 7001 
Rule 7001(2) is ambiguous in its application to strip-off because there are 
three plausible interpretations of the Rule. Rule 7001(2) states that an 
adversary proceeding is necessary to “determine the validity, priority, or extent 
 
 300 United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (“There is, of course, no more 
persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give 
expression to its wishes.”). 
 301 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) ( “[The] first step in interpreting a statute is to 
determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning . . . .”), cited in Miyong Mary 
Kang, Comment, Is It Time to Hang the Hanging Paragraph, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)?, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. 
J. 49, 66 (2009). 
 302 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 93 (2007). 
 303 Kang, supra note 301, at 66 (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340). 
 304 Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341, quoted in Kang, supra note 301, at 66.  
 305 Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 419 n.2 
(2005). 
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of a lien.”306 Strip-off under § 506 requires an assessment of the residence to 
determine the value of the attached secured claims.307 The value of the 
residence determines the value of the allowed secured claim.308 The junior 
mortgage is stripped off if the allowed secured claim renders a mortgage 
wholly unsecured.309 The majority has concluded that the value of the 
collateral is the disputed matter in a strip-off.310 Under this perspective, change 
to the “validity, priority, or extent of [the] lien” in strip-off is based solely on 
the valuation of the residence, and therefore Rule 7001(2) does not apply.311 
Another interpretation, held by the minority, is that Rule 7001(2) applies 
because, when a lien is stripped off, the lien’s priority changes from secured to 
unsecured.312 A third possible interpretation is that the phrase “extent of the 
lien” means “the value of the property subject to the lien.”313 As all three of 
these interpretations of 7001(2) to strip-off are plausible, the statute is facially 
ambiguous.314  
Since Rule 7001(2) is ambiguous as applied to strip-off, it is necessary to 
determine which reading is the most coherent and consistent with the statutory 
scheme.315 Rule 1001 describes the spirit of the Bankruptcy Rules.316 It states, 
“These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every case and proceeding.”317 
The minority’s position that Rule 7001(2) applies to strip-off is inconsistent 
with the goals of the Bankruptcy Rules.318 A Rule 7001(2) adversary 
proceeding causes delays to the confirmation of the debtor’s plan.319 The court 
 
 306 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(2). 
 307 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006); see also In re King, 290 B.R. 641, 648 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003). 
 308 See Wolski v. JP Morgan Bank, NA (In re Wolski), No. 10-23090, 2010 WL 3614243, at *2 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 2010). 
 309 Tanner v. FirstPlus Fin., Inc. (In re Tanner), 217 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 310 See In re Sadala, 294 B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003); In re Hoskins, 262 B.R. 693, 696–97 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2001); In re Fuller, 255 B.R. 300, 306 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2000). 
 311 See In re Fuller, 255 B.R. at 305–06. 
 312 See, e.g., In re Chukes, 305 B.R. 744, 744–45 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2004). 
 313 10 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 7001.03[1] (considering and rejecting this interpretation). 
 314 Cf. Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 419 
n.2 (2005). 
 315 See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)). 
 316 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001. 
 317 Id. 
 318 See, e.g., In re Sadala, 294 B.R. 180, 182–83 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003) (“Clearly, an adversary 
proceeding is more formal, takes longer, and is more costly [than a contested matter].”). 
 319 See Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 81; see also In re Sadala, 294 B.R. at 182–83 (“[T]he debtor must 
serve a summons accompanied with the complaint to the named defendant . . . .”). 
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cannot confirm the plan until the strip-off has been fully litigated, a process 
that can take several months.320 An adversary proceeding also requires 
additional court and attorney’s fees.321 Moreover, submitting a strip-off motion 
or plan to a creditor without an adversary proceeding satisfies the 
constitutional standard of being “reasonably calculated” to provide notice.322 
Requiring an adversary proceeding to strip off a junior mortgage is contrary to 
the statutory goals of the Bankruptcy Rules to have a “just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every case”;323 a motion is, after all, faster and 
cheaper than an adversary proceeding and still provides adequate notice.324 
Therefore, requiring an adversary proceeding is not coherent or consistent with 
the statutory scheme. 
2. Application to Rule 3012 
Rule 3012 unambiguously applies to strip-off motions. It states that “[t]he 
court may determine the value of a claim secured by a lien on property” upon a 
party in interest’s motion.325 The plain text of the statute provides that only a 
motion is required to value a claim secured by real property.326 There is no 
other plausible interpretation of the statute. As the value of the collateral is the 
matter in dispute for a strip-off, Rule 3012 clearly applies to strip-off.327 
Because Rule 3012 clearly and unambiguously applies to strip-off, no further 
inquiry is required.328 However, if additional statutory examination were 
required, then applying Rule 3012 to strip-off also is consistent with the 
statutory scheme. Strip-off via motion provides adequate notice in a cheaper, 
quicker, and more efficient manner than through an adversary proceeding.329 
Therefore, strip-off can, and should, be achieved through a motion. 
 
 320 See Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 81. 
 321 Id. at 14; see also In re Sadala, 294 B.R. at 183 (“Filing fees associated with adversary proceedings 
are substantial.”). 
 322 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 323 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001. 
 324 See In re Sadala, 294 B.R. at 182–83 (noting strip-off by motion “provides due process in a 
streamlined and efficient manner”). 
 325 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012. 
 326 See id. 
 327 See In re Robert, 313 B.R. 545, 549 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Rule 3012 specifically permits Code 
§ 506(a) collateral valuations to be requested on motion provided notice and opportunity for hearing is given to 
the affected party.” (citing FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012)). 
 328 See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 93 (2007). 
 329 See In re Sadala, 294 B.R. at 182–83 (noting the ways that contested matters “provide[] due process in 
a streamlined and efficient manner”). Conversely, “an adversary proceeding is more formal, takes longer, and 
is more costly.” Id. at 183 (citing FED. R. BANKR. P. 7003, 7004, 7008)). 
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B. The Advisory Committee’s Intent 
The advisory committee’s intent indicates that Rule 3012, not Rule 
7001(2), applies to strip-off. Rule 3012 implements § 506(a) and provides that 
“[t]he court may determine the value of a claim secured by a lien on property 
in which the estate has an interest on motion of any party in interest.”330 One 
could argue that such a proceeding is intended to determine the “extent of the 
lien” pursuant to Rule 7001(2).331 However, such a reading is contrary to the 
text of the advisory committee’s notes to Rule 3012.332 The committee’s notes 
assert that a Rule 7001 adversary proceeding “is relevant to the basis of the 
lien itself” which differs from a Rule 3012 valuation.333 Furthermore, the 
committee’s notes plainly state that Rule 3012 applies to a § 506(a) valuation 
of allowed secured claims.334 If a lien is determined to be wholly unsecured 
under a § 506(a) valuation, that lien is vulnerable to strip-off.335 Since Rule 
3012 applies to a § 506(a) valuation, a Rule 3012 motion is required to 
determine the lien subject to strip-off.336 The intent of the advisory committee 
makes it clear that a Rule 7001 adversary proceeding is required only when the 
extent of the lien is in dispute, i.e., what property is subject to the lien.337 A 
Rule 3012 motion is required to value (and therefore avoid) a wholly 
unsecured residential mortgage.338 The committee’s intent was undoubtedly to 
apply Rule 3012 to strip-off. 
V. POLICY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF STRIP-OFF BY MOTION 
Policy considerations also support requiring the use of a motion to strip off 
an unsecured mortgage rather than using an adversary proceeding. An 
underlying goal of bankruptcy is to achieve fair and balanced results for both 
creditors and debtors.339 Further, both methods attempt to balance a policy of 
 
 330 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012; FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012 advisory committee’s notes. 
 331 10 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 7001.03[1].  
 332 Id. 
 333 Id. (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012 advisory committee’s notes). 
 334 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012 advisory committee’s notes. 
 335 In re King, 290 B.R. 641, 648 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003); In re Sadala, 294 B.R. 180, 185 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 2003).  
 336 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012 advisory committee’s notes. 
 337 See id. (“[An adversary proceeding under Rule 7001] is relevant to the basis of the lien itself while 
valuation under Rule 3012 would be for the purposes indicated above[, e.g., § 506(a) valuations].” (emphasis 
added)). 
 338 See In re Sadala, 294 B.R. at 182 (interpreting FED. R. BANKR. P. 3012 advisory committee’s notes). 
 339 Vivian Luo, Comment, A Preference for States? The Woes of Preempting State Preference Statutes, 24 
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 513, 528 (2008) (“In each subsequent Act, Congress sought to better ensure the equal 
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fairness with a concern for efficiency.340 The application of Rule 3012 to strip-
off, which does not require an adversary proceeding, best achieves the policy 
goals of both the courts and the Code. This Comment makes six policy 
arguments for why a Rule 3012 motion is the correct procedure to strip off a 
wholly unsecured junior mortgage. First, adversary proceedings are more time 
consuming and costly. Second, they afford too much leverage to creditors, 
giving them the ability to strong-arm the debtor into full repayment. Third, an 
adversary proceeding does not actually afford the creditor additional notice of 
a strip-off. Fourth, a motion is sufficient to afford the creditor actual notice. 
Fifth, an adversary proceeding does not provide any necessary procedural 
protections that are not granted by a Rule 3012 motion. Sixth, strip-off via a 
chapter 13 plan may provide insufficient procedural protections to creditors. 
A. Judicial Economy—Increase in Cost and Time 
Adversary proceedings require additional expenses such as filing fees and 
attorney’s fees.341 Initiating an adversary proceeding requires a $350 filing 
fee.342 This cost can be significant, especially for a bankrupt individual.343 
Additional attorney’s fees may be needed to separately litigate a strip-off in an 
adversary proceeding.344 The debtor’s attorney must prepare a complaint and 
file the necessary motions to achieve a strip-off.345 The debtor’s attorney may 
have to appear in court in a proceeding separate from the plan confirmation 
process, which is also costly to the debtor.346 These administrative expenses 
diminish the money available to pay unsecured creditors. 
Additionally, adversary proceedings delay the confirmation process.347 
Rule 7012(a) gives the creditor thirty days to respond to a debtor’s strip-off 
 
treatment of creditors and to balance the rights and obligations of debtors and creditors in a manner that 
maximizes repayment to creditors while giving debtors a measure of relief.”). 
 340 See In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 461 B.R. 200, 243 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (considering the “two important 
bankruptcy goals” of “fairness among creditors and administrative efficiency” in calculating interest for 
creditor claims (quoting Onink v. Cardelucci (In re Cardelucci), 285 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2002)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 341 See Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 14. 
 342 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006) (amended 2011). 
 343 See In re Sadala, 294 B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003) (“Filing fees associated with adversary 
proceedings are substantial.”). 
 344 Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 14. 
 345 See DRAKE ET AL., supra note 2, § 11A:4. 
 346 See Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 81. 
 347 Id. at 14. 
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adversary proceeding,348 which is comparable to the twenty-eight days 
provided by some courts to object to a Rule 3012 motion.349 However, if the 
creditor contests the strip-off in an adversary proceeding, the court must 
provide the creditor with adequate time to engage in discovery, pretrial 
motions, and potentially a trial.350 All of this preparation can cause serious 
delays to the confirmation of the debtor’s plan.351 Adversary proceedings force 
judges to spend unnecessary time rendering decisions on strip-offs, which 
causes greater costs to be borne by taxpayers.352 Further, junior mortgages may 
be significant secured debts that debtors are obligated to pay to keep their 
homes.353 Whether this debt can be stripped off therefore might be vital to the 
feasibility of the plan,354 and a court is unable to confirm a plan that is not 
feasible.355 Therefore, a court is unlikely to confirm a plan before the strip-off 
is resolved. 
The delay inherent in requiring an adversary proceeding can be harmful to 
debtors.356 Resolving issues through an adversary proceeding takes longer than 
the resolution of motions as adequate time must be afforded to prepare for, and 
possibly conduct, a trial.357 Rule 3012 motions avoid these additional 
procedures. The judge can simply rule on the original motion or, in situations 
where there is a response, hold a hearing.358 Although the plan repayment 
period does not begin until plan confirmation, the Code requires debtors to 
begin plan “payments not later than [thirty] days after the filing date of the 
 
 348 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(a). 
 349 See In re Bennett, 312 B.R. 843, 848 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2004) (requiring a Rule 3012 motion to be 
filed with the plan and thereby incorporating the provisions of Rule 2002(b)). 
 350 Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 81. 
 351 See id. at 14. 
 352 See Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 14, 81. 
 353 See In re Millspaugh, 302 B.R. 90, 93 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003) (noting that the value of the debtors’ 
junior mortgage was $37,565.98). 
 354 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2006) (requiring that the plan must be feasible and that it be apparent the 
debtor will be able to make all payments and to comply with the plan); see also 8 COLLIER, supra note 22, 
¶ 1325.07 (discussing the “feasibility standard" in § 1325(a)(6)). 
 355 United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1381 n.14 (2010); see also 8 COLLIER, 
supra note 22, ¶ 1325.07 (“[Feasibility is] by far the most important criterion for the confirmation of a chapter 
13 plan in terms of promoting the success of chapter 13 proceedings . . . .”). However, bankruptcy courts have 
considerable discretion in appraising the feasibility of a plan and have confirmed otherwise infeasible plans 
that were subject to continued monitoring by the court or trustee. See 8 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 1325.07[1]. 
 356 Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 14. 
 357 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7026–7037, 7040–7041, 7055–7056, cited in Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 
81 n.20. 
 358 See In re Sadala, 294 B.R. 180, 182–83 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003) (“Often, the creditor will not dispute 
the relief requested in the motion, files no response, and the motion is granted upon notice but without the need 
for any hearing after the response period passes.”). 
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plan.”359 Therefore, a debtor may need to make plan payments even though the 
plan has not been confirmed. 
B. Too Much Leverage to the Creditor 
Temporal and administrative delays not only hinder the debtor but also 
increase creditor leverage.360 Legal fees to initiate and conduct an adversary 
proceeding are much more burdensome on the individual debtor than the 
creditor, which is typically a large mortgage-holding institution.361 Thus, a 
debtor might be less likely to attempt a strip-off due to the extra cost of the 
adversary proceeding. Further, an adversary proceeding allows creditors to 
delay plan confirmation until the proceeding is resolved.362 As noted, the Code 
requires the debtor to start paying into the plan thirty days after the plan is 
filed.363 If the creditor delays the plan confirmation, the debtor would have to 
make payments without the benefits of plan confirmation.364 The adversary 
proceeding requirement gives a clever creditor more ways to delay the plan 
confirmation and cost the debtor money.365 The extra cost and delay may 
compel the debtor to give up on what is an otherwise legal strip-off. Therefore, 
the increase in leverage to the creditor would run contrary to the Bankruptcy 
Rules goal of “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and 
proceeding.”366 
C. Adversary Proceeding’s Extra Notice Is Unnecessary 
A junior creditor does not need an adversary proceeding to receive 
sufficient notice of a strip-off. A creditor receives notice that its lien will be 
stripped when a contested matter is initiated through a motion or plan.367 
Usually, a motion includes a statement that the creditor’s lien will be stripped 
 
 359 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1); see also Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 14. 
 360 See Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 14, 81. 
 361 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the 
Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1012 (2009) (“[Large banks] have dominated 
the markets for residential mortgages and credit cards markets since 2000. In 2001, the top five mortgage 
lenders were Chase, Wells Fargo, [Bank of America], Washington Mutual (Wamu) and Countrywide.”). 
 362 See Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 81. 
 363 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). The court does have statutory discretion to require that the debtor begin 
making plan payments at a date different than thirty days after the plan is filed. Id. 
 364 Abood-Carroll, supra note 4, at 14. 
 365 See id. at 14, 81. 
 366 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001. 
 367 See In re Bennett, 312 B.R. 843, 848 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2004); In re King, 290 B.R. 641, 649 (Bankr. 
C.D. Ill. 2003). 
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off and that the creditor has a specified period to contest the strip-off.368 The 
plan provisions also warn the creditors that their rights may be impaired.369 
The debtor sends these documents to lenders, many of whom are in the 
business of administering mortgages.370 These lenders are typically 
sophisticated “repeat players” in the bankruptcy process and should be 
presumed aware that wholly unsecured junior mortgages can be stripped off.371 
A creditor is properly served with a plan or motion when the creditor has a full 
and fair opportunity to object to the plan.372 The creditor, once properly served, 
can object to the legality of the strip-off, the valuation of the property, or the 
feasibility of the plan;373 as long as reasonable steps to alert the creditor have 
been taken, “the constitutional requirements [should be] satisfied.”374  
Supporters of adversary proceedings argue that the use of a motion or plan 
to strip off a wholly unsecured mortgage is discharge by ambush.375 Their 
concern is that the debtor’s notice is not intended to notify the creditor of the 
strip-off. 376 The debtor has every incentive to camouflage the notice and hope 
that the creditor will overlook the strip-off.377 A bankruptcy proceeding creates 
 
 368 In re Bennett, 312 B.R. at 848.  
 369 See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2010). (“In boldface type 
immediately below the caption, the plan stated: ‘WARNING IF YOU ARE A CREDITOR YOUR RIGHTS 
MAY BE IMPAIRED BY THIS PLAN.’”). 
 370 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Espinosa stated: 
It makes a mockery of the English language and common sense to say that [the creditor] wasn’t 
given notice, or was somehow abused or taken advantage of. The only thing the creditor was not 
told is that it could insist on an adversary proceeding and a judicial determination of undue 
hardship. . . . But it’s not clear why letting the creditor know, in plain terms, that its rights will be 
impaired by the proposed plan—and then leaving it up to the creditor and his lawyers to figure 
out what objections or remedies are available—doesn’t satisfy the Tenth Circuit’s “heart of 
the . . . notice” standard. After all, we aren’t talking here about destitute widows and orphans, or 
people who don’t speak English or can’t afford a lawyer. The creditors in such cases are huge 
enterprises whose business it is to administer the very kinds of debts here in question. 
See Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193, 1201 (9th Cir. 2008) (second alteration in 
original), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010). 
 371 See Bennett v. Springleaf Fin. Servs. (In re Bennett), No. 11-32916, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 31, at *36 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2012) (“The [strip-off] provisions address the claims of sophisticated institutional 
creditors . . . who make loans to consumers often secured by a junior lien on a debtor’s residence.”); see also 
Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1201.  
 372 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 373 See In re Sadala, 294 B.R. 180, 182–83 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003). 
 374 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15. 
 375 See In re Forrest, 424 B.R. 831, 832–33 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 376 See Discharge-by-Declaration: The Ninth Circuit Flies Solo, BANKR. L. LETTER, Nov. 2008, at 6, 7 
(addressing similar concerns in student loan cases).  
 377 See id.  
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a “flood of paperwork” and thus “requires clear rules to . . . ‘know what 
notices to notice as opposed to the notices that are deafening legal background 
noise.’”378 It costs the debtor nothing to insert an otherwise improper strip-off 
provision into its plan.379 Creditors in the residential mortgage business are 
unlikely to be misled by the plan confirmation process or somehow tricked by 
the debtor into not recognizing its rights will be impaired.380 These types of 
creditors have resources which are sufficient to protect their rights.381 
Moreover, mortgage creditors that have teams of attorneys are unlikely to fail 
to understand that their liens would be stripped off once the creditors are 
served with a motion.382  
D. A Motion Is Sufficient to Afford the Creditor Notice 
Courts prescribe, or should prescribe, specific requirements for Rule 3012 
strip-off motions that make it very likely actual notice will occur.383 The 
motion must “make clear and conspicuous the proposed treatment of the 
creditor’s claim and the factual and legal basis for such treatment.”384 The 
motion must be filed with a chapter 13 plan, which grants parties at least 
twenty-eight days to file objections.385 These safeguards, in addition to the fact 
that strip-off motions are served on creditors in the business of making 
residential loans, make it very likely that actual notice will be achieved.386 
 
 378 See id. (quoting In re Ruehle, 296 B.R. 146, 164 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003), aff’d sub nom. Ruehle v. 
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Ruehle), 307 B.R. 28 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 412 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 
2005), overruled by United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010)). 
 379 See id.  
 380 See Bennett v. Springleaf Fin. Servs. (In re Bennett), No. 11-32916, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 31, at * 36 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2012) (“[A] financial institution in the business of making loans to 
debtors . . . secured by residential real estate, indisputably stands as a sophisticated creditor that should be 
versed in the intricacies of bankruptcy generally and [c]hapter 13 specifically.”); see also Espinosa v. United 
Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010). But see In re 
Forrest, 424 B.R. at 832–33. 
 381 See Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1201. 
 382 See In re Bennett, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 31, at *35–36 (“If [the creditor] did not understand the 
provisions of the Plan addressing valuation of the real estate, it was incumbent upon that representative to 
inquire of its legal counsel.”).  
 383 In re Bennett, 312 B.R. 843, 848 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2004). 
 384 In re Millspaugh, 302 B.R. 90, 99 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003) (citing In re Rheaume, 296 B.R. 313, 321 
(Bankr. D. Vt. 2003)). 
 385 In re Bennett, 312 B.R. at 848 (“The [Rule 3012] motion must be filed with the Chapter 13 
plan . . . .”); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(b). 
 386 See Espinosa, 553 F.3d at 1201 (addressing a similar issue regarding student loan creditors). 
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Even if the creditor does not get actual notice of the strip-off, the notice 
granted by a Rule 3012 motion would likely still be constitutional.387 The 
constitutional standard for notice in bankruptcy need only be “reasonably 
calculated” to offer the creditor the opportunity to object.388 Actual notice is 
not required; notice by mail is necessary only when the name and location of 
the creditor is known.389 The mailing of a clearly identifiable strip-off motion 
to a sophisticated creditor easily meets the Mullane standard for notice. 
Therefore, the extra cost imposed on the debtor to carry out an adversary 
proceeding for a strip-off is unnecessary and a waste of resources. 
E. Adversary Proceedings Provide No Essential Additional Procedural 
Protections 
An adversary proceeding pursuant to Rule 7001 does not add to the 
procedural protections that a creditor has under a Rule 3012 motion. A Rule 
3012 motion initiates a contested matter pursuant to Rule 9014.390 Litigation of 
a dispute via a contested matter is very similar to an adversary proceeding.391 
“Contested matters . . . can still result in discovery and in trials before the 
bankruptcy judge.”392 Rule 9014 contested matters apply forty-seven of the 
seventy-seven FRCPs that apply in adversary proceedings; the applicable 
FRCPs relate to findings of fact, discovery, subpoenas, evidence, judgments, 
and conclusions of law.393 When applied to contested matters, these rules 
should provide sufficient due process for a creditor contesting a strip-off 
through a Rule 3012 motion.394  
In extraordinary cases, Rule 9014 gives the judge discretion to order 
additional procedural protections.395 The onus to initiate extra protections lies 
on the judge, which eliminates the excessive leverage granted to the creditor by 
 
 387 See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 225 (2006) (“[D]ue process does not require actual notice . . . .”); 
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950).  
 388 See Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1378 (interpreting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314). 
 389 See Jones, 547 U.S. at 225; see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–18. 
 390 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014 advisory committee’s notes (“Whenever there is an actual dispute, other than 
an adversary proceeding, before the bankruptcy court, the litigation to resolve that dispute is a contested 
matter.”); see also 9 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 3012.01. 
 391 John G. Stevenson, Jr., Comment, Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, 9 
BANKR. DEV. J. 643, 660–61 (1993). 
 392 Ayer, supra note 124, at 16. 
 393 Christopher M. Klein, Bankruptcy Rules Made Easy (2001): A Guide to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure That Apply in Bankruptcy, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 35, 39 (2001). 
 394 See 10 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 9014.06. 
 395 Klein, supra note 393, at 39; see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014. 
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an adversary proceeding.396 Judicial discretion allows the judge to determine 
which cases deserve additional protection and thus provides a balance between 
a streamlined procedure and protecting creditor’s rights through additional 
processes.397 In the overwhelming majority of cases, the procedural safeguards 
in strip-off motions are constitutionally sufficient.398 Coupled with judicial 
discretion to enact additional procedures, the strip-off of a wholly unsecured 
junior mortgage by motion provides a creditor with adequate due process 
protections without the additional cost and time associated with adversary 
proceedings. 
F. Strip-off by Plan May Provide Insufficient Procedural Protections 
Both a chapter 13 plan and a motion to strip off a lien provide 
constitutionally sufficient procedural protection to the creditor. However, there 
are several reasons why filing a motion to achieve strip-off is a better 
procedure than allowing strip-off by the plan. As previously determined, Rule 
3012 requires a motion to strip off a lien.399 Furthermore, these mortgage 
lenders are typically sophisticated business entities and should understand that 
a chapter 13 plan could alter their rights, making adversary motions a needless 
burden.400  
Nevertheless, suppose the rare circumstance happens where the creditor is a 
private individual, and the only loan the creditor has ever made is now subject 
to a strip-off. A motion to strip off a lien is a one or two-page document that is 
usually very easy to understand.401 At a minimum, it may prompt the creditor 
to seek legal advice. A chapter 13 plan is usually much longer and contains 
information about every creditor, as well as detailed financial statements.402 
 
 396 See Stevenson, supra note 391, at 661 (noting that the judge’s discretion “prevent[s] a simple 
contested matter from becoming mired down in unnecessary procedural formalities”). 
 397 See id.; see also In re Sadala, 294 B.R. 180, 182–83 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003). 
 398 See, e.g., In re Millspaugh, 302 B.R. 90, 102 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003) (holding the use of a Rule 3012 
motion to strip off “compl[ies] with considerations of due process”); In re King, 290 B.R. 641, 651 (Bankr. 
C.D. Ill. 2003) (holding chapter 13 plan providing for a strip-off “comport[s] with due process concerns”). 
 399 Supra Part II.C.2. 
 400 Supra Part V.C. 
 401 For an example, see Motion to Value Collateral at 4, In re Kountanis, No. BK-S 10-10253-BAM 
(Bankr. D. Nev. May 11, 2010), 2010 WL 2213356. 
 402 See In re Forrest, 424 B.R. 831, 832 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009). 
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The plan is harder for unsophisticated creditors to understand and so these 
creditors may inadvertently give up their rights to oppose the strip-off.403 
Allowing strip-off through the plan also runs contrary to the purpose of the 
chapter 13 plan document and may be judicially deficient. In many 
jurisdictions, the court provides debtor’s counsel with a form chapter 13 
plan.404 The form includes common terms and conditions that may be inserted 
in the plan such as details of the debtor’s finances.405 These forms, however, 
do not usually include “provisions that act as declaratory judgments that 
purport to adjudicate legal issues between parties if the plan is confirmed.”406 
Strip-off via the plan would do just that by undermining the rights of the junior 
creditor through confirmation of the plan.407 A motion puts the resolution of 
the strip-off dispute in its proper medium, protecting junior creditors’ rights by 
guaranteeing clearer notice and a modicum of procedure. Therefore, the correct 
procedure is strip-off via motion, not through a plan. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the majority of bankruptcy courts have held an adversary 
proceeding is not required for strip-off, the controversy is far from over. No 
circuit courts have addressed the issue, and practitioners are left in the dark as 
to the correct procedure for strip-off. In the absence of authoritative direction 
from the Supreme Court or the circuit courts of appeals, this Comment has 
attempted to clarify this complex and confusing issue. 
The main point of contention between the minority and majority 
approaches is the applicability of Rule 7001.408 The minority contends that the 
plain language of Rule 7001 indicates that it applies to strip-off.409 On the 
other hand, the majority holds that Rule 7001 does not apply because the Rule 
3012 and advisory committee’s intent indicate that Rule 3012 applies to strip-
 
 403 See Bennett v. Springleaf Fin. Servs. (In re Bennett), No. 11-32916, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 31, at *35 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2012) (“The language advising creditors that the [plan] confirmation hearing would 
serve as a [strip-off] hearing may be difficult for a lay person to comprehend.”).  
 404 In re Forrest, 424 B.R. at 832.  
 405 Id. 
 406 Id. 
 407 See id. at 832–33. 
 408 See, e.g., In re Chukes, 305 B.R. 744, 744–45 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2004); In re King, 290 B.R. 641, 646–48 
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003). 
 409 Pierce v. Beneficial Mortg. Co. of Utah (In re Pierce), 282 B.R. 26, 28 (Bankr. D. Utah 2002) 
(explaining that the plain language of Rule 7001(2) requires an adversary proceeding to achieve a strip-off). 
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off.410 Further, there is more disagreement within the majority as to whether a 
strip-off must be accomplished by a separate motion or if a plan indicating an 
intent to strip off suffices.411 Rule 7001 does not apply to strip-off and a 
separate motion is required to comply with Rule 3012. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Espinosa further indicates that an 
adversary proceeding is not required by undercutting two key arguments that 
the minority uses to support requiring an adversary proceeding to strip off a 
junior mortgage.412 The Supreme Court held that the “reasonably calculated” 
standard is the constitutional requirement for notice in bankruptcy and that res 
judicata can bar an appeal of a confirmed plan that did not initiate an adversary 
proceeding as required by the Bankruptcy Rules.413 These holdings have 
important implications to the procedural requirements for strip-off and they 
support the majority’s approach. 
Further, from a policy perspective, an adversary proceeding is unnecessary 
for strip-offs of wholly unsecured junior mortgages. Important policy 
considerations such as maintaining judicial economy, avoiding needless 
additional costs, and granting creditors too much leverage all speak against 
requiring an adversary proceeding for strip-off. Although an adversary 
proceeding does afford a higher degree of notice through the filing of a formal 
complaint, this extra notice is unnecessary.414 A motion provides creditors with 
the necessary procedural protections to contest a strip-off. 
It is important to ensure that chapter 13 debtors who are trying to keep their 
homes know and follow the correct strip-off procedure. The Great Recession 
and the increased number of foreclosures415 has made strip-off a powerful tool 
for debtors. If a debtor follows the incorrect procedure, however, a court might 
find the plan invalid due to insufficient notice and find that the junior lien on 
his or her home was never actually stripped off. Because a debtor’s largest and  
  
 
 410 In re Robert, 313 B.R. 545, 549–50 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Sadala, 294 B.R. 180, 182 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 2003). 
 411 Lloyd & Holtschlag, supra note 23, at 68. 
 412 See supra Part III.A. 
 413 See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1380–81 (2010). 
 414 See In re Sadala, 294 B.R. at 185. 
 415 See Mann, supra note 13, at A27. 
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most important asset—his or her home—is at risk, an insufficient strip-off will 
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